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O CANADA!: THE STORY OF RAFFERTY,
OLDMAN, AND THE GREAT WHALE
Oliver A. Houck*
Abstract: In the late twentieth century, environmental policy swept the
world, and among its primary instruments were processes for evaluating
the adverse impacts of proposed actions. In all countries these processes
quickly came into conºict with established bureaucracies, none more
powerful and resistant to change than those in charge of water resources
development. They also conºicted, in many cases, with established ideas
of governance, right down to principles of federalism, judicial review, and
the separation of powers. So it was in Canada, where in the late l980s
three water resources development schemes, each one more enormous,
initiated the commonwealth’s approach to environmental impact assess-
ment and challenged the ability of the national government to protect
environmental values at all.  The litigation was heavy and prolonged. In
the end, federal environmental authority gained a signiªcant foothold,
but one insufªcient to protect the natural and human resources at stake.
The litigation also illustrated, as has been the experience in the United
States, the critical importance of citizen enforcement actions and judicial
review in securing the objectives of environmental law.
Introduction
In the late 1980s, environmental law came to Canada, riding on
the backs of three water projects that, together, challenged the gov-
ernment’s approach to environmental protection right down to con-
stitutional principles and the allocation of powers. The ªrst made en-
vironmental impact review law; the second made it constitutional; the
third made it work.
The litigation was ªerce and of ªrst impression. It was surrounded
by equally ªerce politics and the passions of people so thoroughly con-
                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, Tulane University. The research assistance of Christa Fanelli,
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vinced they were in the right that they did not need to explain. Envi-
ronmentalists took to the streets; Crown and Provincial Ministers
traded insults; First Nation tribes paddled a ºotilla in protest down the
Hudson River to the island of Manhattan; some people went to jail. Ca-
nadians then and since use words like “ªasco,” “embarrassment,” and
“long litany of screw ups” to describe the action.1 At the end of the day,
by hook and by crook, two of the projects were completed. The largest
and most complex, however, ceded to another vision of the environ-
ment, governance, and, at bottom, what water is for. They are known as
Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman, and the Great Whale.
It is no accident that these extraordinary challenges arose out of
water resource projects. There are two things about water that are all
but irreconcilable. One is pragmatic: it is the lifeline of every civiliza-
tion on earth,2 and so it has fallen to civilization’s engineers to wall off
the ºoods, slake the droughts, divert the waters, and harness their
power—the Aswan Dam, the Tennessee Valley Authority—some of the
proudest monuments of humankind. And a few of the more regretta-
ble.
The other thing about water is spiritual. The rivers and lakes that
refract the light, wash away sins and renew souls are the mark of bap-
tism3 and the home of Siddhartha;4 they “make glad the City of
                                                                                                                     
1 George N. Hood, Against the Flow: Rafferty-Alameda and the Politics of
the Environment 128 (1994) (stating that there were a litany of screwups); Carol Goar,
The Politics Behind Ottawa’s Concern for James Bay, Toronto Star, July 18, 1991, at A17 (sta-
tiong that it was a ªasco and an embarrassment).
2 A colleague and water lawyer in the ancient capital of Sevilla has written wryly of “the
peculiar tendency of rivers to ºow through cities.” Email from Maria Louisa Real, Counsel,
Confederación Hidrograªca de Guadalquivir, to author (Dec. 12, 2004) (on ªle with
author).
3 Marilynn Robinson, Gilead 24–25 (2004), stating:
Ludwig Feuerbach says a wonderful thing about baptism. I have it marked.
He says, “Water is the purest, clearest of liquids; in virtue of this its natural
character it is the image of the spotless nature of the Divine Spirit. In short,
water has a signiªcance in itself, as water; it is on account of its natural quality
that it is consecrated and selected as the vehicle of the Holy Spirit. So far
there lies at the foundation of Baptism a beautiful, profound natural
signiªcance.”
Id.
4 Hermann Hesse, Siddhartha 118 (Hilda Rosner trans., New Directions 1951) (stat-
ing “there was a man at this ferry who was my predecessor and teacher. He was a holy man
who for many years believed only in the river and nothing else. He noticed that the river’s
voice spoke to him. He learned from it; it educated and taught him . . . .”); see also Marga-
ret Mead, People and Places 266–67 (1959):
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God.”5 We are made of water. Every culture reveres it. There is some-
thing terrible about burying aquatic systems and their inhabitants,
entire ways of life, under a hundred miles of a hundred feet of dark-
ness.6 For all time. Seen from this end of the spectrum, the engineer’s
triumph is a loss too painful to bear.
The environmental movement in the United States was born largely
of that pain. In the early twentieth century the Sierra Club, until that
point a gentriªed collection of weekend hikers, turned radical at the
prospect of converting a granite-peaked, waterfall-studded valley the
size of Yosemite into the Hetch Hetchy reservoir,7 and became the most
powerful environmental voice in the United States. Fifty years later it
would lose its federal tax exemption for lobbying against another gov-
ernment water project, Glen Canyon dam on the Colorado River.8 The
ªrst U.S. environmental lawsuit in modern times opposed the Storm
King Mountain power plant that threatened to kill millions of aquatic
organisms in the Hudson River,9 and the ªrst case to deªne impact as-
sessment and send environmental law into orbit arose over thermal dis-
charges from a nuclear power plant into the Chesapeake Bay.10 Water
                                                                                                                     
Another religious practice which has come down through history is the use of
blessed water for special purposes—to purify the thing it touches, to remove
evil, or simply to bless and purify a person who wishes to pray or who has
ªnished praying. However, the idea that water is pure and can be used in spe-
cial ways connected with religion is such a natural one for human beings to
have when they are trying to get closer to the supernatural world that we be-
lieve many different peoples have thought of it.
Id.
5 Psalms 46:4 (King James) (“There is a river, the streams whereof shall make glad the
city of God, the holy place of the tabernacles of the Most High.”).
6 See Hal Kane, The Dispossessed, World Watch, July/Aug. 1995, at 7, stating:
A World Bank study has found that public works projects in the developing
world now force more than 10 million people out of their homes every
year. . . . Large dams—about 300 are built each year–account for nearly half
the total. Even as objections to these projects are raised on environmental, as
well as humanitarian, grounds, even larger dams are being designed.
Id.
7 See Stewart L. Udall, The Quiet Crisis 121–22 (1963).
8 Thomas B. Allen, Guardian of the Wild: The Story of the National Wildlife
Federation, 1936–1986, at 147 (1987).
9 See generally Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965). For background on this case, see Unªnished Stories, supra note *, at 869–80.
10 See generally Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For background on this case, see Unªnished Stories, supra note *,
at 876, 878, 880–93. The court’s opinion, which deªned the requirements for environ-
mental impact assessment, was followed by a string of lawsuits challenging the U.S. Army
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was a primary driver for environmental law in the United States. As it
would be for Canada.
I. Water on the Plains: The Rafferty-Alameda Dams
Those who came to settle North America did not ªnd it easy any-
where, but some particularly harsh scenarios played out on the western
prairies which cut a wide swath north from Kansas and Nebraska,
through the Dakotas and across Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Mani-
toba.11 Lured on by railroad promotions that combined fantasy with
outright fraud, the prairie settlers broke the earth, ploughed under the
native grasses, planted wheat, lived in houses of sod, endured unimag-
inable winters, and prospered or failed by the rains. “[R]ain would fol-
low the plough” declared the agronomists of the day,12 the theory being
that the release of moisture from cultivated soil seeded the atmosphere
and prompted an ever-increasing cycle of precipitation. Of course, the
opposite happened.
Severe droughts in the late 1800s bankrupted platoons of settlers,
leading, among other things, to a call by U.S. Geological Survey chief
John Wesley Powell for the water-based zoning of the West.13 Railroad
and real estate boomers, threatened by the proposal, replied by driv-
ing Powell from ofªce, but they seized on one part of his vision: a se-
ries of water supply dams to feed their land scheme promotions. So
began federal water resources development in the western United
States.14 Thirty years later, the dust bowl threw a serious curve into
settlement on the plains, a curve from which they have not since fully
recovered and perhaps never can. Storms of snow and dirt rose from
the prairies, blackened the skies and, dumped loads that buried tele-
phone poles as far east as Chicago and Albany.15 A Canadian who lived
through it recalls a joke about the Saskatchewan farmer who went out
                                                                                                                     
Corps of Engineers and the Tennessee Valley Authority’s water resources projects directly.
See infra notes 50–51.
11 For classic descriptions of the hardships of prairie life, see, e.g., Willa Cather, O
Pioneers! (Houghton Mifºin 1988) (1913); Maria Sandoz, Old Jules (Hastings House
1960) (1935).
12 Udall, supra note 7, at 94. For a detailed critique of water resources development in
the western United States, see generally Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert (1986).
13 See generally Wallace Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John Wesley
Powell and the Second Opening of the West (1982) (describing the life and proposals
of John Wesley Powell).
14 Id.; see also Udall, supra note 7, at 88–96.
15 Ian Frazier, Great Plains 196–97 (1989).
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to cultivate his land and ended up ªnding it in Manitoba.16 When the
winds ªnally died, the answer was: more dams.
A. A Case for the Engineers
The [U.S.] Army Corps of Engineers, arguably the preeminent
dam builders in the world, told us that it would take them eighteen
years to build the Rafferty and Alameda dams. . .[T]he Saskatche-
wan engineers responded with more than a little bravado and
smug nationalism that it would only take us three years. They were
wrong.
—George Hood, project manager, Rafferty-Alameda dams 17
George Hood lived the saga of the Rafferty-Alameda dams. He
helped plan them, promoted them, and suffered along with the other
occupants of the rollercoaster as they bounced among provincial and
national authorities and then the courts. He begins an account of his
experiences with the observation, “The predominating unit of time in
Saskatchewan is not the minute or the hour, or even the day, but the
season.”18 He means the growing season, of course, and for the farms
near Estevan in the south of the province it has been a hard ªght to
keep a crop of wheat on wafer-thin topsoil laced with stones and rocks
from the glacial valley of the Souris River. The landscape he saw was
“lacking in natural beauty.” Rather, it was strewn with oilªeld
pumpjacks and pipelines, spoil mounds from coal mines, two power
plants “frequently shrouding the city in an acidic haze,” and a hodge-
podge of small dams and culverts designed to convert the feast-or-
famine waters of the Souris river to human use.19 Clearly, to Hood,
this was a place that could use some engineering.
Unlike most western rivers, the Souris is fed only by rainfall, so in
wet years it can produce ºoods several miles wide, and the years in be-
tween will be so dry you can step across it in dress shoes.20 Respecting
no borders, the river rises in Saskatchewan, snakes South into North
Dakota, and then back up into Manitoba. The United States had been
busy on its stretch of the Souris, building dams for irrigation and ºood
control, and by the 1960s it had twenty-one dams in the watershed mak-
ing claim to most of its ºows. It was not until the 1970s that Saskatche-
                                                                                                                     
16 Hood, supra note 1, at 6.
17 Id. at 2.
18 Id. at 5.
19 Id. at 8.
20 See id. at 11–12.
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wan began asserting the Canadian claim, including one rather aggres-
sive proposal to build a canal rerouting the river away from the United
States entirely. When, in 1969, the river poured down to ºood the capi-
tol of North Dakota for forty straight days, the Americans were willing
to see Canada put in some dams of its own. They found their champion
in a border rancher who rode into the North Dakota legislature on the
issue of taming the Souris, Orlin “Bill” Hanson. Hanson was a friend
and neighbor of the future deputy premier of Saskatchewan, Eric
Berntson. Berntson represented residents along Moose Mountain
Creek, future site of the Alameda Dam. Delivering a dam to your home
district is The Prize. The politics were right for the deal.
The planners went to work. Confronted by the unhappy fact that
the anticipated beneªts to agriculture would not offset project costs,
they added a power plant, boat ramps and other bells and whistles.21
They also consulted with their U.S. counterparts, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, who told them that a project of this size would take dec-
ade to complete, maybe two.22 The Canadians thought the ªgure
crazy; they could do it in three years.23 They were off by ªfteen.
Finally, in 1986, Premier Devine unveiled a plan for two dams,
the Rafferty and the Alameda.24 There was a glitch, however. The pro-
jects would have to pass Saskatchewan’s environmental review process,
and the early feedback was acerbic. The proposal contained no
beneªt-cost analysis, no description of mitigation measures, no opera-
tional plans, and quite a few unsubstantiated claims.25 Indeed, there
was no indication of where the Alameda dam would be built at all.
Rather hard to conduct an adequate review on that record. Respond-
ing to these criticisms, the Rafferty-Alameda team went into a hurry-
up offense, according to engineer Hood a “sixteen week blitz” to get
its environmental documents in order.26 They knew what they were
going to do. It was simply a matter of jumping through the hoops.
                                                                                                                     
21 See generally id.
22 Hood, supra note 1, at 2. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ reputation for project
construction is matched by its reputation for manipulating project purposes, and costs and
beneªts, in order to obtain the necessary approvals. See Michael Grunwald, A River in the
Red; Chanel Was Tamed for Barges That Never Came, Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 2000, at A-1. See gen-
erally Arthur E. Morgan, Dams and Other Disasters: A Century of the Army Corps
of Engineers in Civil Works (1971); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n & Taxpayers for Common
Sense, Crossroads: Congress, the Corps of Engineers and the Future of America’s
Resources (2004).
23 Hood, supra note 1, at 2.
24 Id. at 38.
25 Id. at 41.
26 Id. at 47.
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B. A Case for the Sportsmen
Rafferty-Alameda Dam Could Reduce Bird Populations By 30,000,
Report Says.
—Headline, Toronto Star, 1991 27
The highest of the hoops was a rising environmental awareness
across Canada and a particularly active local sportsmen’s organiza-
tion, the Saskatchewan Wildlife Federation. Sportsmen’s organiza-
tions go way back in U.S. history to the days of Teddy Roosevelt, when
they were instrumental in the elimination of market hunting.28
Alarmed by the devastation of waterfowl and wetlands during the
droughts of the 1930s, duck hunters promoted some of the ªrst con-
servation laws of the twentieth century, including the purchase and
protection of the wetlands these birds needed to breed, feed, and sur-
vive.29 In the 1940s and ’50s, watching new threats to their hard-won
resources from dams and canals, they lobbied through a law, noble in
purpose if short on results, that declared ªsh and wildlife conserva-
tion a co-equal purpose of water resources development.30 In the
1960s, hunting and ªshing organizations were the ªrst to protest,
then oppose, a new construction binge by the Corps of Engineers,
Bureau of Reclamation, and like-missioned agencies. They had their
own lobby in Washington D.C., the National Wildlife Federation,
which had looked at new-fangled environmentalism with some suspi-
cion but was about to catch the wave.31 When, in the early 1970s, pub-
lic interest law ªrms for environmental protection such as the Na-
tional Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense
Fund appeared on the scene and started winning lawsuits (and head-
                                                                                                                     
27 Toronto Star, July 5, 1991, at D10.
28 For background on sportsmen’s organizations, see William T. Hornaday, Our
Vanishing Wild Life: It’s Environment and Preservation 53–61 (1913); George Rei-
ger, Hunting and Trapping in the New World, in Wildlife and America: Contributions to
an Understanding of American Wildlife and its Conservation 42, 44, 46–47, 52
(Howard P. Brokaw ed., 1978); Richard H. Stroud, Recreational Fishing, in Wildlife and
America, supra, at 53–84 and see generally Allen, supra note 8.
29 See, e.g., Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 669 (West 2006);
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661–667 (West 2006); Migratory Bird
Hunting Stamp Act, 16 U.S.C. § 718 (West 2006); Dingell-Johnson Sport Fish Restoration
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 777 (West 2006). See generally Michael J. Bean & Melanie J. Rowland,
The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (3d ed. 1997).
30 See 16 U.S.C. § 661–667.
31 See generally Allen, supra note 8.
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lines), the National Wildlife Federation followed suit.32 Within a few
years it had a full docket, primarily against dams, channels, and other
water projects.33
Meanwhile, north of the border, the Canadian Wildlife Federa-
tion, a loose conglomerate of state hunting and ªshing groups with
barely the budget to hold an ofªce together, moseyed forward in no
particular hurry.34 Onto the scene walked Ken Brynaert, an entrepre-
neur with ideas to grow the organization to ªt the times. He had a
plan; all he needed was $150 thousand in startup money.35 “It
shouldn’t take a week,” he told the Canadian Federation’s board.36
“You’ve got a week” said its President, Orville Erickson.37 Orville was
also President of the Saskatchewan Wildlife Federation and a conser-
vationist (the word “environmentalist” came very slowly to the sports-
men’s community) to the core. He and Brynaert would power the na-
tional group forward. And he would come to hate the Rafferty-
Alameda dams.38
In the short run, however, Brynaert had exactly seven days to
make his case for a new Canadian Wildlife Federation. He hopped the
next ºight south to Washington D.C. and met with the National Wild-
life Federation’s chief executive, Tom Kimball. Kimball, formerly di-
rector of the ªsh and game departments in both Arizona and Colo-
rado, had enormous credibility in the sportsman’s world. He was also
a devout Mormon with a ºair for the malaprop (he spoke of “expo-
                                                                                                                     
32 Personal observation: The author served as General Counsel to the National Wild-
life Federation during this time.
33 See generally Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973) (challeng-
ing the environmental impact statement on the Corps dam); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s
League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525 (D. La. 1979) (challenging a private defendants’
land-clearing operations under the Clean Water Act); S. La. Envtl. Council v. Sand, 629
F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1980) (challenging the environmental impact statement on the Corps
navigation project); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1982)
(challenging the EPA determination that water quality changes caused by dams were not
required to be regulated under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System es-
tablished by § 402 of the Clean Water Act), rev’d 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982); La. Wildlife
Fed’n, Inc. v. York, 761 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1985) (dealing with the regulation of dredge
and ªll under the Clean Water Act); S.C. Dep’t of Wildlife & Marine Res. v. Marsh, 866
F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1989) (challenging water quality impacts of Corps dam).
34 Telephone Interview with Ken Brynaert, former Executive Director, Canadian Wild-
life Federation (May 20, 2005). The description that follows of the Canadian Wildlife Fed-
eration is taken from the interview.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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tential growth”) and a keen sense for the right thing to do. Kimball’s
Federation had members, money, and a good set of monthly maga-
zines. He lent Brynaert the monies he needed to get started, put In-
ternational Wildlife Magazine at his service for new Canadian mem-
bers, and welcomed him to the family. Where Brynaert met the
Federation’s environmental lawyers and got the idea.
The Canadian Wildlife Federation case against Rafferty-Alameda
was right out of the environmentalist bad-moments-in-water-develop-
ment playbook. In the ªrst place, it was ºooding out prime wildlife
habitat; nearly everything that swims, ºies, or walks on four legs in the
western plains is found in or on the banks of rivers like the Souris, the
Platte, and the San Pedro. In the second place, it was a rip-off, funnel-
ing more than $100 million in public monies to a handful of ºoodplain
farmers looking to make more money out of wet crops like sugar beets
that had no business on the western plains in the ªrst place. The rest of
the project purposes were window dressing. It would be a lot cheaper to
pay the farms at issue to set back from the river. Wetlands and waterfowl
up and down the continent had taken a huge beating to agriculture
over the last century, and now to the dam building boom. Rafferty-
Alameda could take 30,000 more. It was time to draw the line.
In 1987, at a joint meeting of the Canadian and National Wildlife
Federations in Quebec City, a resolution was passed to oppose the
dams.39 More aggressive, they passed a censure motion against the
Canadian Minister of the Environment for failing to assert federal ju-
risdiction over the projects. Brynaert then delivered the censure to
the Minister in person, at his hotel room in Quebec. More aggressive
still, he was going to litigate.
C. The Government Gets the Call
In the Canadian context, what the environmental assessment pro-
cess applies to, particularly at the federal level, has been deter-
mined as much by how it evolved as anything else.
—George Hood, project manager 40
The governance of Canada is pretty much what Americans
thought they were creating 200 and some years ago, a partnership of
states and federal interests in which the federals were conªned to a
very small box, and the rest was left to state capitals. Of course, the
                                                                                                                     
39 Id.; see also Hood, supra note 1, at 47.
40 Hood, supra note 1, at 59.
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United States began to depart from this model as early as 1787 when
it traded the Articles of Confederation for the Constitution and has
been departing ever since with new orbits of national authority to
meet at ªrst economic, then social, and now security needs. Canada,
meanwhile, has clung to the states-rights model, tested increasingly by
more global imperatives. One of the stiffest tests would be environ-
mental policy.
There was another understanding as well: the judiciary. Courts at
all levels were to resolve disputes before them; they did not set policy,
nor did they gainsay the policies of elected ofªcials. The United States
broke this mold too, early on, when the Supreme Court in Marbury v.
Madison41 declared itself competent to declare policies enacted by the
legislature unconstitutional, and over the last century U.S. courts have
become players in racial integration, school prayer, abortion rights, and
other sensitive social issues. Canadian courts, as those of mainland
Europe and England, have viewed these events with alarm and resisted
all initiatives to join the fray. Environmental law would put this philoso-
phy to another severe test.
The root problem was as follows: Neither the delegates to the
U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787 nor the drafters of the Cana-
dian Constitution Act of 1867 had the slightest notion of environ-
mental problems nor concern to address them. No language even
close to the word “environment” appears in either document. Under
constitutions establishing governments of limited powers, then,
authority to protect the environment would not seem to lie at the fed-
eral level at all. The United States would come to a different answer
slowly, over time, through an expansive interpretation of the federal
power to regulate interstate commerce,42 an interpretation under se-
rious counter-attack today by those who would de-nationalize envi-
ronmental law.43 Canada would take a different route.
As in the United States, the Canadian Constitution spells out na-
tional powers with precision, including a few related to the kind of
environmental issues that would be waiting 100 and some years down
                                                                                                                     
41 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
42 For a description of Commerce Clause challenges to environmental law, see Robert
V. Percival, “Greening” the Constitution—Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional Values,
32 Envtl. L. 809, 830–33 (2002) and see generally Christine A. Klein, The Environmental
Commerce Clause, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2003).
43 See generally Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001) (implying that regulation of intra-state wetlands is beyond federal consti-
tutional authority); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(challenging federal protection of endangered species).
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the road. The most relevant of these national powers was the author-
ity to legislate on navigation, ªsheries, and federal lands.44 At the
same time, the Constitution gave the provinces exclusive powers over,
among other things, public works, property, and the “development of
natural resources,” including the production of electrical energy.45
Dams come to mind. While the Canadian government had some
foundation for passing laws to protect the ªshery, and perhaps even to
prevent its contamination by pollution,46 it was on thin ice when it
came to enacting general environmental law. And the ªrst of the new
environmental laws to sweep the United States, Canada, and the rest
of the world were very general indeed: environmental impact review.
The lead vehicle was the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 and its principal requirement, an environmental impact state-
ment for major federal actions. Canada would inch toward the same
objective, very gingerly.
The federal government in Ottawa was small, underpowered, and
far away from nearly every activity in Canada that impacted the envi-
ronment.47 Environmental protection in the 1970s had acquired some
cachet, but it had also acquired some strong opponents including, for
openers, a Who’s Who of U.S. and Canadian industry. On thin ice
                                                                                                                     
44 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5, pt. VI,
§ 92 (App. 1985) (describing Exclusive Powers of Provincial Legislatures). For further
information on federal environmental jurisdiction in Canada, see Marcia Valiante, “Wel-
comed Participants” or “Environmental Vigilantes”? The CEPA Environmental Protection Action and
the Role of Citizen Suits in Federal Environmental Law, 25 Dalhousie L.J. 81, 91–96 (2002) and
see generally John Borrows, Living Between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental
Planning and Democracy, 47 U. Toronto L.J. 417 (1997), and Sven Deimann, Comment, R.
v. Hydro-Quebec: Federal Environmental Regulation as Criminal Law, 43 McGill L.J. 923
(1998).
45 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5, pt. VI,
§ 92A (App. 1985) (stating that the legislature may exclusively make laws regarding non-
Renewable Natural Resources). For further information on federal environmental jurisdic-
tion in Canada, see generally Borrows, supra note 44; Deimann, supra note 44; Valiante,
supra note 44.
46 See generally The Queen v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401.
47 Yves Corriveau, Citizen Rights and Litigation in Environmental Law NGOs as Litigants:
Past Experiences and Litigation in Canada, in Environmental Rights: Law, Litigation &
Access to Justice 117, 117–18 (Sven Deimann & Bernard Dyssli eds., 1995), stating:
Canada is the second largest country in the world: from east to west, 5514
kilometers separate Cape Spear in Newfoundland from the Yukon-Alaska
border. It is therefore difªcult for the 86 people responsible for enforcing the
laws of Environment Canada and the personnel of the provincial Environ-
ment Ministries to maintain an adequate surveillance of all of the areas within
their jurisdictions.
Id.
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constitutionally and looked on with suspicion by provincial govern-
ments jealous to retain their own autonomy, Ottawa’s caution towards
imposing environmental impact requirements was heightened by its
perception of what was unfolding south of the border,48 where envi-
ronmentalists had taken the same requirements to court to challenge
government programs with alarming success. The American lawsuits
led to delays and injunctions while new impact statements were writ-
ten and their often-embarrassing contents were exposed to the press.
Among the casualties of this litigation were water resources develop-
ment projects, on which elected politicians depended to please con-
stituents and ªll campaign coffers. The very ªrst U.S. environmental
impact statement cases enjoined the Cross Florida Barge Canal,49 Gil-
ham Dam,50 and the Cache River Bayou DeVieu,51 all big price-tag
projects of very doubtful merits.52 Message to Canada from the United
States: environmental impact review can be dangerous to your politi-
cal base, treat with caution.
And so Canada did.53 Tentatively, feeling its way, the federal gov-
ernment issued a cabinet directive in the early 1970s creating a federal
Environmental Assessment and Review Process, unfortunate acronym
“EARP,” run by a new Federal Environmental Review Ofªce, even more
                                                                                                                     
48 Id. at 119.
49 See generally Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 324 F. Supp. 878
(D.D.C. 1971).
50 See generally Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F. Supp. 806 (D. Tenn. 1972),
aff’d, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). These proceedings continued later.  See generally Envtl.
Def. Fund v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Tenn. 1973), aff’d, 492 F.2d 466 (6th
Cir. 1974).
51 See generally Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 421 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Ark. 1976),
aff’d, 566 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1977).
52 Indeed, NEPA disclosures lead to the eventual cancellation of both the Cross Florida
canal and the Cache River project. See supra notes 49, 51.
53 G. Bruce Doern, Getting It Green: Case Studies in Canadian Environmental
Regulation 12 (1990), stating:
Environment Canada’s inherent capacity was blunted from 1975 until the late
1980s by four dynamics. The ªrst was an inability to establish and carry out
rigorous compliance procedures. The second was a weakening through
budget cuts of an already overtaxed scientiªc and investigative capacity. The
third was the federal government’s insecurity in its relations to the provinces
and among its own departments. And ªnally, Environment Canada was itself
primarily a technical department, possessing only limited economic and even,
to some extent, legal literacy and analytical capacity. Directly or indirectly, all
of these elements were indicators of the low position that environmental pol-
icy and implementation occupied on the political and economic agenda.
Id.
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unfortunate acronym “FEARO.”54 The process, so written, went into
hiding.55 In 1979, propelled forward by an increasingly restive public,
the Parliament tried to move the ball forward, directing the federal
Minister of the Environment to coordinate federal impact reviews and
issue guidelines for doing them.56 On the campaign trail, the conserva-
tive party even promised to legislate an environmental review process
itself, only to lose its ardor upon winning the elections.57 Instead, ªve
years later, the Environment Ministry issued an administrative Guide-
line Order asking that the “initiating department” undertake a “self
assessment process” to “ensure that the environmental implications of
all proposals for which it is the decision making authority are fully con-
sidered.”58 This Order would set the rules of the game when Rafferty-
Alameda and its companion water projects came on stage.
The guideline process was simple.59 The federal agency con-
structing or licensing a project did a ªrst screen, with the assistance of
FEARO, to decide if it had environmental problems. If not, end of
story. If so, FEARO appointed an Environmental Assessment Panel of
experts with relevant knowledge and no conºict of interest.60 After its
own investigation and public consultation, the Panel reported its
ªndings and recommendations back to the construction agency and
the environment minister.61 Should these two authorities reach differ-
ent conclusions, the matter went to the Cabinet itself.62 It was a clean-
looking drill and, for those familiar with NEPA and the U.S. experi-
ence with a process controlled far more exclusively by development
agencies, one that promised fair results. If in fact it could be enforced.
Which is where the Rafferty and Alameda cases came in.
                                                                                                                     
54 See Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/84–467
(1984) (Can.), available at http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/013/0002/earp_go_e.htm [herein-
after EARP Guidelines Order]; Roger Cotton & John S. Zimmer, Canadian Environmental
Law: An Overview, 18 Can.-U.S. L.J. 63, 75 (1992).
55 See Constance D. Hunt, NEPA’s Legacy Beyond the Federal Government, 20 Envtl. L.
789, 793 (1990).
56 See id; Cotton & Zimmer, supra note 54, at 75.
57 See generally EARP Guidelines Order, supra note 54.
58 Id. § 3.
59 See id.; Cotton & Zimmer, supra note 54, at 75–76. The description of the EARP
guideline process that follows is taken from these sources.
60 EARP Guidelines Order, supra note 54, §§ 20–22.
61 Id. § 31.
62 Can. Wildlife Fed’n Inc. v. Canada (Minister of the Env’t), 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 201, 225
(1989) (T.D. Can.).
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D. In with a Bang: Rafferty-Alameda I
[T]here is an irony in these proceedings which could make a cynic
cackle with glee.
—Canadian Wildlife Federation v. Minister of the Environment 63
Rafferty-Alameda was the ªrst of the dam projects to court, and
the suits came in waves. The initial lawsuit was ªled by one Donald
Wilkinson, a rancher who sought to quash a set of public hearings on
the dams scheduled during peak ranching season.64 He pointed out
that he had only sixty days to prepare comments on a new impact
statement of 1805 pages (the Rafferty-Alameda team had indeed been
busy).65 Further, the public hearings seemed timed to minimize op-
posing voices and unwelcome news. When a member of the provincial
parliament confronted Premier Devine with complaints about the
schedule from the Stock Growers Association, he was told that “his-
tory will show what you know and don’t know about the stock growers
would ªll a large room, my boy.”66 My boy. It was the attitude, and it
would infect everything about the process from then on. When ques-
tioned about the reason for submitting two separate environmental
reviews for the dam projects and a third for the power station, al-
though they were connected to each other at the hip, indeed each
justiªed the other, provincial Minister of the Environment Swan re-
plied: “That’s the way they came to us; they’ll be dealt with in that
manner.”67 End of discussion. Answers like this from public ofªcials
tend to breed their own opposition.
After a short hearing, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
dismissed Wilkinson’s suit on technical grounds: since the environ-
mental board holding the hearing would make no legally binding de-
cisions, it didn’t matter if the proceedings were rigged.68 Further, the
ranchers could always submit their comments later. The ensuing pub-
lic hearings on the Rafferty-Alameda impact statement were the short-
                                                                                                                     
63 Can. Wildlife Fed’n Inc., 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) at 213, 225.
64 Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings (Hansard) (22 Sept. 1987)
(Mr. Lyons) 4–7, available at http://www.legassembly.sk.ca/hansard/21L1S/87-09-22.pdf
[hereinafter 22 Sept. Proceedings]. See generally Wilkinson v. Rafferty-Alameda Bd. of In-
quiry, [1987] 64 Sask. R. 170.
65 Wilkinson, 64 Sask. R. at 171.
66 22 Sept. Proceedings, supra note 64, at 5–6.
67 Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings (Hansard) (3 July 1987)
(Mr. Shillington) 19–20, available at http://www.legassembly.sk.ca/hansard/21L1S/87-07-
03.pdf.
68 See Wilkinson, 64 Sask. R. at 172.
2006] O Canada! 189
est in history for an environmental review.69 But only the opening
shot had been ªred.
Next into the fray came a local coalition called the Association to
Stop Construction of the Rafferty Alameda Project, a.k.a. SCRAP.70 Fol-
lowing Minister Swan’s environmental clearance, SCRAP challenged
the adequacy of the underlying review under the Saskatchewan Envi-
ronmental Assessment Act. The government responded with a familiar
litany of defenses, starting with the proposition that SCRAP had no
standing to bring the case.71 The court found SCRAP’s members, which
included several local landowners, sufªcient for standing72  and, fur-
ther, that the complaint raised a “real and substantial controversy which
is appropriate for judicial determination,” the adequacy of the envi-
ronmental review.73 So far so good. Then the court fainted. Dismissing
a claim for damages, it turned to the crux of the matter: an environ-
mental review that allegedly failed to “deal fully with [the] impact to
the environment.”74 This claim fell to a bevy of defenses familiar to a
reader of, say, Charles Dickens and the inscrutable mysteries of the law.
By statute, the duty to conduct an adequate review fell to the Lieuten-
ant Governor, not the Environment Minister (as if they were not the
same government) and, adding greater insult, even if SCRAP could
prove violations on the part of the Minister, they were not enforceable
because “the Minister answers to the Legislature alone.”75 At least inso-
far as compliance with environmental statutes was concerned, the Min-
ister was above the law. If this opinion held, environmental law in Can-
ada was on the rocks.
Enter the Canadian Wildlife Federation with a more potent
claim.76 It wasn’t just the Saskatchewan government that was violating
the law; it was the federal Ministry of Environment in Ottawa failing
to follow the EARP Guideline Order. The Ministry had conducted no
environmental review and, instead, cleared the project based on the
Saskatchewan process.77 Angered by the Ministry’s refusal to consider
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70 See generally Ass’n of Stop Constr. of Rafferty Alameda Project v. Saskatchewan,
[1988] 68 Sask. R. 52.
71 Id. ¶ 1.
72 Id. ¶¶ 7, 30.
73 Id. ¶¶ 38–39, 44.
74 Id. ¶¶ 71, 74.
75 Id. ¶¶ 75, 85.
76 See generally Can. Wildlife Fed’n Inc. v. Canada (Minister of the Env’t), [1989] 3 F.C.
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its several requests (even the famous, hotel-room-delivered motion to
censure brought no response), the Federation sought a court order
that the Ministry conduct its own review. The Federation’s complaint
alleged that the provincial assessment did not consider impacts be-
yond its borders, including U.S. impacts (of course, to have done so
would have admitted the federal nature of the impacts), nor did it
consider effects on (federal) ªsheries and, most importantly, migra-
tory waterfowl that were protected by international treaties.78 Once
the federal Minister was seen to have jurisdiction, he would be com-
pelled to convene the independent Environmental Review Panel, and
it would be a whole new ballgame.
The Rafferty-Alameda project, strongly supported by the provin-
cial government, was a hot potato, however, and the Minister wanted
no part of it. He argued, ªrst, that the EARP guidelines were only
suggestions from the federal government, not law, and, further, that
the project had been fully reviewed by Saskatchewan.79 The guidelines
applied only if there was no “duplication resulting from the applica-
tion of the process,” he noted, and federal review here would add just
such duplication.80 The federal trial court rejected both defenses. It
found that the EARP guidelines were “not a mere description of a pol-
icy or programme,” they were regulations and created rights that were
“enforceable by way of mandamus.”81 As for duplication, the Rafferty-
Alameda affected areas of central federal responsibility, migratory
birds for one; indeed, the federal Environment Ministry itself had
written Saskatchewan that there were “a number of important infor-
mation gaps” concerning areas of federal concern.82 And so, on April
10, 1989, a day that, to the project proponents, will live in infamy, the
court enjoined construction of the Rafferty Dam, then only twenty
percent complete.83 Through this ruling, the ºedging and politically
weak Ministry of Environment had done with its guidelines what it
could never have done in the Parliament: it had passed a binding law.
A scant two months later, the appellate court upheld the ruling.84
According to Ken Brynaert, who was in attendance, the judges did not
                                                                                                                     
78 See Can. Wildlife Fed’n Inc., 3 F.C. at 313–14.
79 Id. at 315.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 322.
82 Id. at 323.
83 Hood, supra note 1, at 70; see also Canada (Attorney Gen.) v. Saskatchewan Water
Corp., [1990] 88 Sask. R. 13, ¶ 23.
84 See generally Can. Wildlife Fed’n Inc. v. Canada (Minister of the Env’t), [1989] 2
W.W.R. 69 (F.C.A. Can.).
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even bother to retire to consider the government’s case; they whis-
pered among themselves a little and then ruled: appeal denied.85 The
success of the lawsuit sent shockwaves across Canada. It was the ªrst
case enjoining a government project of any kind on environmental
grounds. It emboldened a broad band of citizen groups to think that
the government, too, would have to answer to the law, and that the
courts would back them up.86 On the day of the opinion, a member of
the provincial House of Commons from Saskatoon, Saskatchewan,
rose to say: “I was pleased to hear that the federal license has been
lifted by the courts, and this government has been shown for what it
is, that this government can’t be trusted when it comes to the envi-
ronment in our province.”87
News of the Canadian Wildlife Federation verdicts hit the Rafferty-
Alameda team like the end of the known world. They had fully ex-
pected to win in court.88 Nobody understood the opaque EARP guide-
lines and this was, after all, their dam, not Ottawa’s. Eric Berntson
told a standing-room only crowd at Estevan that he was “madder than
hell” about getting stopped by people “no more interested in the en-
vironment than they are in ºying to the moon.”89 He was almost
drowned out, however, by the “background roar” from opposition
members.90 To him and his supporters, and to the very end, they were
on the side of the angels; the uproar was simply about a bumbling,
intrusive federal agency and politics-as-usual. And so, they would
ratchet up the politics on their side. They even made their own movie,
“Dreams in the Dust.”91 It featured a widow whose husband keeled
over from a heart attack when he learned of the project delays. Engi-
neer Hood’s chapter on the ªght that followed is entitled “Getting
The Better of Them.”92
Given a mission it had by no means sought, the federal ministry
(now called Environment Canada) had to conduct an environmental
review. Scrambling and under pressure, in August 1989 the agency
completed an internal review, found no environmental problems, and
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approved a new license for Rafferty-Alameda.93 And without doubt
hoped that it could walk away. Instead, this time, it prompted two law-
suits, one by the Canadian Wildlife Federation against Rafferty94 and
the other by two farmers, the Tetzlaff brothers, against Alameda.95
The Tetzlaffs’ case had a special tug to it: Alameda Dam had originally
been proposed for the Souris River well upstream of its conºuence
with Moose Mountain Creek. That was in fact the location analyzed in
Saskatchewan’s environmental impact review. Now, the site had been
moved downstream, by more than ªfty miles, and on top of their
property which would lie forever under 120 feet of water.96 To the Raf-
ferty-Alameda team, no worries; the Tetzlaffs would be paid for their
land.97 It was simply a matter of money.
Back in court, the issues in these cases were no longer whether En-
vironment Canada had to conduct a review but, rather, whether the is-
sues were serious enough to invoke the independent review panel and
the full EARP process. The trial court minced no words. The EARP
guidelines might be ambiguous, but there was no avoiding the major
impacts of the Rafferty Dam with promises of unproven and unspeciªed
mitigation.98 The government’s position that it was too late to apply the
guidelines—having itself refused to apply them earlier—“could make a
cynic cackle with glee.”99 Most stingingly, the court referred to the gov-
ernment’s arguments as attempts to “excuse lawbreaking”:100 “If there
be anyone who ought scrupulously to conform to the ofªcial duties
which the law casts upon him or her in the role of a high State ofªcial it
is a Minister of the Crown. That is just plainly obvious.”101
This language was more than a shot across the bow of the envi-
ronmental bureaucracy. It was a shot through the hull. The court
quashed the licenses unless the Ministry convened an Independent
Review Panel for the Rafferty-Alameda dams.102
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E. Out with a Whimper: Rafferty-Alameda II
Really, the whole thing was just a charade.
—Rod MacDonald, Stop Construction of the Rafferty-Alameda
Project (SCRAP) 103
Environment Canada was back on the hot seat. Complicating the
matter, and with the political assistance of their neighbors across the
border, the Rafferty-Alameda team managed to insert into a pending
U.S.-Canada boundary waters agreement a $51 million subsidy from
the Americans for construction of the two dams, which were to be
completed “expeditiously” and to hold Canada liable for any breach
of the pact.104 Armed with this new argument and with its own lobby-
ing clout against a federal environment ministry whose political base
consisted of the diffuse support of environmental groups who spent
most of their time criticizing the ministry for poor performance, the
dam boosters cut a very sweet deal.105 Environment Canada would go
ahead and appoint its Review Panel. But at the same time, land acqui-
sition and construction of associated works for the projects could con-
tinue. Only work on the Rafferty dam within the Souris River itself
would be halted. Environment Canada would, further, compensate
Saskatchewan up to $10 million for project delays. Engineer Hood
and his colleagues uncorked the champagne.
The prospect of now conducting an independent environmental
review on a project released for construction, for which the govern-
ment would itself be liable for any delays, to say nothing of the cost of
possible alterations or an ultimate decision not to proceed, was not
lost on anyone. To a spokesperson for SCRAP, now out of the legal
action but still into the political ªght, the process was a “farce.”106
Most journalists saw it the same way.107 Certainly the proponents saw it
that way. According to engineer Hood, as soon as the second license
was issued on Rafferty, work on the dam “rumbled on into the night,
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unabated, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week until freeze-
up.”108 Locals came out in lawn chairs to watch the action. In the dam
building business, construction is nine/tenths of the law.
Environmental law itself, meanwhile, had reached its high water
mark on Rafferty-Alameda. From here on it went ebb. By Spring 1990
the Rafferty dam was two-thirds completed and construction had
reached the Souris River itself, forbidden ground under the agree-
ment.109 Learning of it, the Review Panel threatened to quit on rather
obvious grounds: why bother to study a fait accompli? When the fed-
eral Environment Minister simply wrung his hands in despair, Sas-
katchewan Premier Devine seized the moment and went for the gold,
ordering construction to resume on “all aspects of the project.”110 The
Panel resigned.111 Environmental review was moot.
But not the legal actions. Alleging a violation of the hard-fought
Saskatchewan-Environment Canada agreement, the Attorney General
of Canada had ªled his own suit to enjoin construction on Rafferty-
Alameda until the Panel ruled.112 The court, retreating to the mindset
expressed in the SCRAP opinion, ruled that such relief simply could
not be obtained against the Crown.113 Even if it could, the court added,
the agreement was a nullity because it had not been approved in the
correct manner.114 The court denied the injunction and then dismissed
the case entirely because once the project was substantially completed
(because there was no injunction) “there would no longer be any pur-
pose in holding a trial.”115 Catch 22: The Crown was above the law; its
agreements on behalf of the public were not worth the signatures that
executed them; there was no need to restrain a project pending envi-
ronmental review because, once the project was completed, there
would be nothing left to litigate no matter what the review disclosed.
The outcome of the Tetzlaffs’ case was even more bizarre. They
had sought the same ends, a review panel and a halt until the panel
had reported.116 But, the court held, reading the EARP guidelines with
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ªnely-honed legal minds, while the guidelines required a Review Panel,
there was no “requirement that any report be made and considered be-
fore any ministerial decisions are made.”117 Continuing in this vein, the
court held that any obligation not to proceed during the review “de-
pends for ‘enforcement’ on the pressure of public opinion and the ad-
verse publicity which will attach to a contrary course of action.”118 To
which conclusion one might ask: why, then, have courts of law?
In February 1991, almost as an afterthought, Environment Canada
went forward to appoint a review panel for the remaining Alameda
Dam.119 That August, however, with the dam thirty percent complete,
the Rafferty-Alameda team produced a consultant to say that an un-
completed dam could cause increased ºooding. The federal Environ-
ment Minister then announced that he would no longer seek to sus-
pend construction while the review took place.120 Construction was not
just nine/tenths of the law. It became ten/tenths.
The aftershocks of Rafferty-Alameda reverberated across Canada.
On the one hand, it was a bad show all round. Everyone ended up
feeling betrayed: the Ministry, certainly the environmentalists, even
the construction team. The press hooted. Legal commentators were
unsparing. Even engineer Hood, rewarded with the completion of his
life’s work, would write a book in the role of victim, unfairly treated by
press, public, and federal government alike. Orville Ericksen went into
retirement and died quietly, folded over his tackle box on a ªshing
trip in the north woods with Ken Brynaert.
 In the end, it was the Oldman verdicts that lived on. Like it or not,
and somewhat by the back door, Canada now had an environmental
review law that it had to deal with. And a judicial opinion that stated, if
there was anyone, further, who had to comply with the law’s require-
ments, it was “high State ofªcials” and “Ministers of the Crown.” But
would courts actually make that happen?
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II. The Second Front: Oldman Dam
The ªght over the Oldman River dam issue is one of the longest,
most bitter and occasionally bizarre episodes in the history of Al-
berta’s conservation movement.
—Ed Struzik, Edmonton Journal, 1992 121
There are always two embarrassments mentioned in the short
history of Canadian environmental law. One is Rafferty-Alameda; the
other is Oldman dam. Much of what happened will look familiar: a
ºedging federal environmental agency struggling to ªnd its bearings
against a province ready to battle and to call its bluff. Only here there
was a new dimension that would grow larger in the Great Whale proj-
ect yet to come: Native Canadians, in this case the Blackfoot Indian
nation, had been occupying the Oldman watershed for up to 12,000
years.122 By the end of the saga one of them would be serving a year
sentence, and Oldman dam would be exhibit A before an interna-
tional tribunal on free trade.
A. The River and Its People
That river was never put aside for economic beneªt, it was put
aside by the creator for every living thing.
—Edwin Yellow Horn, Peigan Nation 123
The Oldman is not a plains river. It rises from snowmelt in the
Rocky Mountains and comes tumbling down in chutes and pools with
a trout ªshery said to be the best in the country. The Blackfeet are
thought to have come into the region after crossing the Bering Sea
from Asia, but their story of Genesis begins with being placed here by
Naipi, the Old Man, who made the world and everything in it. At
which point, after instructing the people how to hunt and live, Naipi
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is said to have retreated “to the high mountains in the headwaters of
the river that now bears his name”—the Oldman.
The Peigan tribe, the largest of the Blackfoot nation, were buf-
falo hunters and when European fur traders encountered them in the
early 1800s they controlled the plains from the Canadian Rockies east
into Saskatchewan and south into Montana. With the arrival of the
snows, the Peigan, like Naipi, withdrew to the Oldman valley where
they remained until spring. Their central wintering ground was at the
conºuence of Crow Lodge Creek and the Oldman River as it emerged
onto the plains, lined by cottonwood trees, a thin ribbon of green
against a ºat and treeless prairie. The river stages marked the seasons
for the Peigan; they timed their sweats and sacred ceremonies by its
rise and fall.124 To Milton Born With A Tooth, the Oldman was a “re-
ligious ecosystem.”125 To the oncoming whites, it was a “water re-
source.”
The ªrst white entrepreneurs into the area were American whis-
key traders, up from Montana, forcing the Dominion government to
send in the Mounties and build the usual fort. Before long, white set-
tlers were on their way in as well. One of the whiskey settlements was
called Fort Whoop-Up. The Peigan resisted what they saw as inva-
sion.126 They did not trap furs or swap goods with the newcomers; they
lived on the buffalo and continued to do so until the ªrepower of
horses and riºes made the high plains a killing ground and the buf-
falo numbers plummeted.127 By the late 1870s the herds at last failed
to show up and the Peigan, dying of starvation, came to terms. In
1877 the Blackfoot nation surrendered all of their lands, including
the Oldman watershed, to the Crown in return for small, tribal reser-
vations and the right to continue to trap, ªsh, and hunt throughout
the region. The Peigan chose a site on the Oldman, failed at farming,
succumbed to alcohol, smallpox, the plague, tuberculosis, and
inºuenza; by the early 1900s they were down to 250 souls. They stand
at perhaps 1500 today.128 Whatever tangible symbol remains of their
religion and culture lies in the upper reaches of the Oldman River as
it comes out of the mountains, less than a dozen miles upstream.
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The ªrst whites tried to farm dry soils with scarce rainfall until, in
1890, an enterprising Mormon by the name of Ora Card dug an irriga-
tion canal from the river to his settlement.129 Joining forces with a Brit-
ish coal company and then the Canadian Paciªc Railway, the immi-
grants expanded their irrigation projects to make crops a little more
tenable and, from the Crown’s point of view, to put some Canadians in
the way of American boomers from the south bent on expanding their
“manifest destiny” and looking north.130 The Dominion Land Act made
irrigated lands available for one-ªfth the going market price (in the
United States, the Reclamation Act made them free for the taking),
and federal irrigation laws promised more diversion projects. In the
words of one historian, a “happy band of politicians, railway ofªcials,
land developers and government engineers” reached their prime be-
fore and after the First World War.131 Their assumption was that irriga-
tion was proªtable and would pay its way. The dust bowl proved other-
wise. The railroad went into deep deªcit, sold off its lands, and
scrambled to get out of the irrigation business. Water resources devel-
opment in southern Alberta, round one, was not a big success.
Round two followed the Second World War, when returning sol-
diers and new waves of immigrants again looked to the western plains.
The federal government launched new water projects to assist them,
but soon learned, as it had thirty years earlier, that “irrigation in west-
ern Canada was a money-losing proposition.”132 As Ottawa maneuvered
to get out of the business, in stepped Alberta which was placing its bets
on the future through expanded agriculture, food processing, and
crops like sugar beets that required more water.133 While ninety percent
of Canadian farmers relied on natural precipitation for crops and
ranching, the western plains depended overwhelmingly on irriga-
tion.134 For Alberta, that meant only two sources and one of them was
Oldman.
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B. The Dam and Its People
Mercy on your soul! You have been assailed by the Southern Al-
berta water lobby.
—Owen G. Holmes, letter to the federal Minister of Environment, 1986 135
The ªrst serious proposals to dam the Oldman River date back to
the 1950s with a federal-provincial study, released ten years later, rec-
ommending a location at the conºuence of the Crows Nest, Castle,
and Oldman, the Three Rivers site.136 A decade of environmental re-
views and public meetings followed, capped by the disappointing con-
clusion of the Alberta Environment Council that “an onstream dam
[was] not required at this time, nor in the foreseeable future.”137 If
one were to be built, however, a better location would be on the Pei-
gan tribe reserve.138 The Peigan promptly put in a demand for com-
pensation, and lots of it.139 Nobody seemed happy, and the project
appeared doomed.
Plans like this, however, do not go away. In 1984, taking advan-
tage of a crippling summer drought, Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed
announced that his government would proceed with the dam at the
Three Rivers location.140 He anticipated, he said, “no environmental
concerns.”141 The environmental facts of life, however, are that dams
block ªsh runs, and irrigation return ºows are notoriously high in silt,
fertilizers, pesticides, and salts and metals leached from the soil.142 A
federal study, completed a few years later, found that there could be
signiªcant impacts indeed on water quality, ªsheries, and the Peigan
reservation downstream.143 The Edmonton Journal saw what was com-
ing. It editorialized: “The Oldman Dam has the potential to be an . . .
environmental disaster.”144
As the proposals for the Oldman waxed, waned, and shifted loca-
tions, a ºedgling group of farmers and environmentalists started rais-
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ing questions, then criticisms, and the battle lines slowly formed.145 Po-
litically, however, it was no contest until they called on a national envi-
ronmental network for help. Down from Calgary came Martha Kos-
tuch, an expatriate from Minnesota, a veterinarian by trade and an
environmentalist by passion who was now living in a town called Rocky
Mountain House, six hours of hard driving away.146 The ªrst thing Mar-
tha did was organize the Friends of the Oldman River Society, acronym
FOR; “We wanted something with a positive ring,” she explains. As the
issues heated up and insults ºew, then nasty letters, then intimidating
phone calls—at one point Martha had the Mounties tap her phone to
monitor the threats she was receiving—there was an advantage to man-
aging this campaign from Calgary. The pressure on local opponents
was also relentless. Alberta sought in court to discover the identities of
the Society’s local members, which could have put the livelihoods of
more than one, particularly those who worked for or with the provin-
cial government, in jeopardy. These are small towns. Everyone knows
everyone. When the Society gave notice it intended to sue over Al-
berta’s approvals for the dam, the provincial Environment Minister Ken
Kowalski branded them “pot smoking social anarchists.” 147 He later
accused them of inciting violence.148 Pressed to explain, he apolo-
gized.149 More or less. And much later.
The Peigan tribe was torn.150 Desperately poor and in need of gov-
ernment aid, they were offered millions of dollars in mitigation for the
dam, which translated into schools, education, the improvement of
their lives. But the tribe was tied to the river, root and branch, every
aspect of its physical and spiritual culture. Which way did responsibility
lie? Deeply divided, the tribal council voted not to oppose. On the
other hand, a warrior group within the tribe, the Loneªghters, main-
taining a warrior tradition of young braves that extended back beyond
memory, took a more aggressive stance.151 They would ªght the dam to
the end, indeed beyond the end. Their spokesman was Milton Born
With A Tooth. They would not join with Martha Kostuch’s Friends of
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the Oldman, but they would pursue their own legal strategy.152 And
they would also raise hell. The stage was now set for a battle that would
test not only the warring parties but the Canadian government and its
authority to make environmental policy at all.
C. Oldman Goes to Court
Why should ordinary citizens ªnd it necessary to go to court to
force their own government to respect the law?
—Editorial, Lethbridge Herald, 1993 153
The legal actions orchestrated by Martha Kostuch and the Society
took two paths. The ªrst asserted federal jurisdiction over the project
under the EARP guidelines.154 In 1986, Alberta had requested a per-
mit from the Ministry of Transport for work in a navigable water, the
same license that would trigger federal responsibility in Rafferty-
Alameda. Beginning in 1987, local environmentalists started petition-
ing both the Transport and Fisheries ministries to comply with the
guidelines.155 The Ministry of Fisheries replied that it had delegated
its responsibilities to the province; Transport replied that this was Al-
berta’s dam. Friends of the Oldman River then petitioned the Minis-
try of Environment to invoke the guidelines directly156 and was re-
fused. The federals wanted no more to do with this one than they did
Rafferty-Alameda.
Meanwhile, the Society went to provincial court challenging Al-
berta Environment Minister Ken Kowalski’s “interim” approvals for the
dam for lack of public participation.157 Kowalski described the charges
as “absurd, nonsensical and to the point of being ridiculous.”158 In his
view—reminiscent of government ofªcials around the globe—he was
the public. In December 1987 the Chief Justice of the Queens Bench of
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Alberta ruled quite the contrary, that the provincial approvals had
“[denied] affected parties the opportunity to voice their concerns”, and
quashed the licenses.159 His decision was not well received. One local
mayor said the judge was “nuts” and “should be sued.”160 Alberta did
the next best thing and appealed the verdict.161 Then it allowed a $97
million construction contract before the appeal could be heard.162 Go-
ing one better, then it dropped its appeal and issued itself a new li-
cense.163 This response would set the pattern for all that followed.
The Oldman River Society was not without recourses of its own.
In August 1988, as the river was being diverted into side channels to
prepare the dam site, Martha Kostuch swore an afªdavit before a local
justice of the peace that the construction was violating the national
Fisheries Act, a federal criminal offense.164 In her view the case was
clear: the only court decision on the matter had ruled the approvals
unlawful.165 When the Alberta Attorney General asserted jurisdiction
over the case, however, Ottawa, with obvious relief, promptly trans-
ferred the case to the province.166 Where of course it expired.167 Al-
berta was not about to sue itself over Oldman Dam.
By spring 1989, despite harsh winter construction conditions, the
dam was 40% complete, building continued, and the legal actions had
not panned out on any front. Then, a miracle occurred. That March,
federal Judge Cullen, sitting in Saskatchewan, found the Ministry of
Transport bound by the EARP guidelines in Canadian Wildlife Federa-
tion I, Rafferty-Alameda dam.168 Within days, Friends of the Oldman
River was in federal court in Alberta, seeking application of this
precedent and federal environmental review for Oldman Dam. This
lawsuit became the main event.
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It is sometimes hard to appreciate, and to understand, the intran-
sigence of the players in environmental litigation. Most lawsuits are
about money. Very few environmental suits, however, are about
money, at least on the part of the people who bring them. What they
want is deeper and far less attainable: they want something they care
about left alone. They are not easy to deal with because a deal offer-
ing them half of the pot is still the death of a loved one. How does
one halve a river? And so when Alberta offered to sweeten the pot on
the ªsheries impacts of Oldman Dam by enhancing the ªsheries on
other rivers in the system,169 that meant little to local environmental-
ists and less to the Peigan tribe. True, you might be able to buy out a
desperately poor tribe for money and aid. But to environmentalists
whose roots in something like the Oldman River are equally spiritual,
if not overtly religious, these cases are like defending Eden from an
invader who is intent on ignoring their issues, funneling money to
friends, inventing bogus beneªts, and breaking the law. An invader
who doesn’t understand them at all.
For Alberta, the dynamics were different but no less vitally felt.
Projects like these were the future of the region. Who could farm the
plains without water? The projects were, further, planned by duly-
elected ofªcials. What happens though is that, at some early point,
having planned them, the ofªcials adopt these projects like children
and quite soon the line between public good and private ego disap-
pears. Not only is their project on the line, they are on the line, and so
begin the insults, the hyperbole, and the need to ram it through come
hell or high water. When Alberta attacked its critics as anarchists and
defended its dam in terms of “feeding a hungry world,”170 it probably
believed what it was saying. Deep down, though—and one does not
have to dig too far—Alberta was defending power. If the Friends of
the Oldman River won the EARP guidelines case and established fed-
eral environmental review of provincial projects, no end of sover-
eignty would be lost. To say nothing of lucrative contracts and politi-
cal clout. To Alberta, Oldman Dam was civil war.
The ªrst EARP case did not go well for the environmental plain-
tiffs. The trial court was on a hot seat and not inclined to follow the
Rafferty-Alameda decision. Ruling in August 1989, he found a way
out, holding that while Rafferty-Alameda involved an international
commission and international impacts, Oldman was purely local so
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the Ministry of Transport’s license did not invoke EARP review.171
Martha Kostuch was devastated,172 but giving up is no more part of the
DNA for a person like Kostuch than it is for government planners.
She plunged immediately into an appeal, while Alberta rolled its bull-
dozers and deepened the diversion canals for the dam. The appeal
would cost money. Friends of the Oldman held a fundraiser, a “cele-
bration” of Oldman with Canadian folk music immortals like Gordon
Lightfoot and Ian and Sylvia and turned out another Woodstock, with
thousands of people in the ªelds, national press coverage, money in
the appeal fund.173 But they had yet to win in court.
Five months later they did. In March 1990, an appellate court
ruled, as in Rafferty-Alameda, that the federal Transport license re-
quired environmental review and ordered both Transport and Fisher-
ies to comply.174 The appellate decision “sent panic through the ranks
of dam supporters,” and it did not stop there.175 The federal Minister
of Environment wrung his hands, lamenting openly that for years eve-
ryone had thought its guidelines were unenforceable.176 Apparently,
the good old days had ended.
With obvious reluctance, the Minister convened an Environ-
mental Review Panel for Oldman Dam.177 Alberta, meanwhile, did the
smart thing. It appealed the decision to the Supreme Court and pro-
ceeded post haste towards completing the dam. The Environment
Ministry—unsure of whether it had the authority to enjoin the con-
struction, unsure of whether, even if it did have the authority, Alberta
would obey(just look at what had happened with Rafferty)—did noth-
ing at all.178 Which would simply replay the Saskatchewan scenario,
but for the legal challenges made to the Supreme Court and their
outcome. Alberta’s claim went deep: the national government had no
constitutional authority to require environmental impact review.
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D. The Peigan Make Their Move
I’m going to continue what I’m doing slowly to mentally and
physically dismantle this dam.
—Milton Born With A Tooth 179
Meanwhile, as Alberta hurried its bulldozers and dallied on its ap-
peal, the Peigan Loneªghters were about to take matters into their own
hands.180 Seeing no relief from the court actions and the dam going up
before their eyes, on August 3, 1990, they announced a “ground break-
ing ceremony,”181 rented a bulldozer from a local construction com-
pany and began a cut into the government’s diversion canal to return
the Oldman River to its natural channel. At a press conference in
nearby Head-Smashed-In-Buffalo-Jump, Milton Born With A Tooth ex-
plained that the Loneªghters were acting to protect the Peigan way of
life. “No more courts for me, no more panels for me. It’s time passion
is brought back to this country” said Born With A Tooth.182 The
Loneªghters also believed, apparently on advice from tribal counsel,
that their actions on tribal land were perfectly lawful. What followed
was a comic-tragedy of mistrust and botched communication.
Milton Born With A Tooth did not act alone. He had signiªcant
support from the Peigan tribe, which in turn was acting in the swirl of
First Nation rights marches, sit-ins, occupations, and violence that
culminated in the summer of 1990, Canada’s “summer of discon-
tent.”183 The Peigan list of grievances against Alberta and the federal
government went back 100 years. They viewed the treaties they exe-
cuted as “shams,” signed by white Indian agents whose corruption was
legendary. “Heck,” one current tribal leader says, “we didn’t know
how to read and we didn’t know how to write; we were still riding
around on horses and shooting Winchesters.” In the early 1920s,
without so much as a by-your-leave from the tribe, Alberta had cut an
irrigation canal across the reservation. The Peigan still consider it il-
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legal. By the late 1960s, as Oldman Dam was percolating along, their
suspicions and sense of injury were already high.
The Peigan opposition to the Oldman dam had been led in the
1970s by Nelson Small Legs, a tribal chief for more than a decade. Nel-
son’s son Edwin grew up with Milton Born With A Tooth, two more go-
ing-nowhere kids, as he describes it, cut loose in the poverty and hope-
lessness of the reservation. In 1978 the two teenagers learned of the
American Indian Movement south of the border, studied up on it, and
fell in. “It changed our lives,” says Edwin. They joined the Native
American Walk Across America that summer and it opened their eyes
to the problems they faced and their possibilities. Edwin Small Legs
recalls: “We met an old lady on the march who told us, ‘We’re already
sick here. Just you wait. You’re going to catch cold too.’”
Now, a decade later, Alberta was building its dam, thumbing its
nose at the environmental lawsuits and the Peigan’s own cases were go-
ing nowhere as well. What the Loneªghters did next was planned civil
disobedience. They sat down, recalls Edwin Small Legs, and “decided
that somebody had to go to jail.” Nobody was paying any attention to
their protests or even to court decisions. Milton Born With A Tooth
spoke up. “I’ll do it,” he said. “I’ll go to jail.” And so, on a hot day in
August, he rented the bulldozer, went to work, and called in the press.
There is a photo of Milton, his sister, and an unnamed Loneªghter on
a dike at the construction site.184 Milton is long haired, broad faced,
and naked from the waist up. He is wearing an amulet around his neck,
and he is smiling.
Events ran their inevitable course. The Loneªghter bulldozer
sank into the mud and became inoperable for days. Somehow they
got a forklift, hauled it out, and soon both machines were digging
dirt. Alberta went into negotiations with the Tribal President and
agreed not to invade the reservation. But the Loneªghters, marching
to their own drum, went on pecking away at diverting the canal.
Then, on September 7, and without any further communication with
the President or Tribal Council, Alberta ofªcials entered the reserva-
tion supported by Royal Mounties, in camouºage and heavily armed.
They impounded the bulldozer, and, helicopters circling overhead,
moved into the Loneªghter camp. No one got hurt. But two shots
were ªred. The government forces halted and eventually pulled back.
The man who ªred the shots was Milton Born With A Tooth.
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E. The Supreme Court Rules
Alberta argues that the Guidelines Order attempts to regulate the
environmental effects of matters largely within the control of the
province and, consequently, cannot constitutionally be a concern
of Parliament. In particular, it is said Parliament is incompetent to
deal with the environmental effects of provincial works such as the
Oldman River Dam.
—Supreme Court of Canada, Friends of the Oldman River Society v.
Canada185
Meanwhile, back in Ottawa, the Ministry of Environment’s inac-
tion on Oldman Dam was becoming embarrassing. Once Alberta ap-
pealed the decision against its project, an assistant to the federal Envi-
ronment Minister announced that the Environmental Review Panel was
“on ice” until the appeal was resolved.186 Friends of the Oldman peti-
tioned a federal court to order the Minister to move. Under the protec-
tive cover of the order, a less-than-eager Ministry ªnally convened its
panel, which went to work on its own assessment, conducted its own
hearing, and prepared its report. Alberta, unwilling to compromise its
legal position, refused to participate in the review process but mounted
a “truth squad”187 to monitor the proceedings and had its views well
represented. At a hearing in Lethbridge one supporter stated that the
dam planners were “educated engineers” and “shouldn’t be ques-
tioned.”188 Truth be told, in their heart of hearts, most engineers would
agree. Meanwhile, construction continued on the dam. When asked
whether Alberta could actually operate the dam without federal ap-
proval, the provincial Environment Minister observed, “Of course we
can . . . we’re doing it now.”189
In another building in Ottawa, the Supreme Court was slowly
grinding its way through the briefs and arguments of Alberta and no
fewer than ªve sister provinces who saw very clearly that their turf was
on the line. Weighing in for the environmentalists was Brian Crane, a
senior attorney from Ottawa who had succeeded before these same
judges in Canadian Wildlife Federation not so very long before. Finally,
in February 1992, the court ruled. One can usually tell how a case will
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turn out with the ªrst few sentences of any opinion. In this case, the
Supreme Court of Canada began: “The protection of the environ-
ment has become one of the major challenges of our time.”190 Attor-
ney Crane must have been feeling pretty good at this point.
The opinion moved through the statutory issues like so much
underbrush. Yes, the EARP guidelines order had been authorized by a
statute.191 And no, it did not conºict with the authorities of Transport
and Fisheries.192 And no, although the dam was largely completed, it
was not too late for mitigating measures or to declare the law before
them.193 Then it arrived at the main event: in a government of limited
powers with natural resources development authority explicitly re-
served to the provinces, was a federal environmental review process,
even one created by federal statute, constitutional?
To Alberta and her sisters the guidelines order was a “constitu-
tional Trojan horse” enabling Ottawa, “on the pretext of some narrow
ground of federal jurisdiction,” to intrude deeply into matters that were
“exclusively” the provinces’ domain.194 The issue was cosmic, because if
the provinces were correct, then national environmental review for all
but federal lands and ªsheries would be history. Not very good history
for Friends of the Oldman River, or for the Canadian Wildlife Federa-
tion for that matter, which had already seen what provincial reviews
produced. Federal environmental authority in the Canadian constitu-
tional framework was, and remains, one of the hottest questions in Ca-
nadian environmental law, and everyone had an opinion.195 Some sim-
ply denied it: “environmental protection” was not a federal power.196
Others taking a “conceptual” or “global” view found federal environ-
mental authority in such “general” constitutional provisions as criminal
law, taxation, or trade.197 The Oldman court did neither. Instead it took
a middle course, but one with a very wide middle that would accom-
modate major national primacy in environmental law.
The middle course was to look at the “basic functions” of the fed-
eral sectoral agencies in this case,198 Transport and Fisheries. Did the
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EARP guidelines impose a new legal order on these constitutionally-
created ministries or simply stretch their powers to include environ-
mental considerations? Faced with the disagreeable alternative of in-
validating an environmental process the court plainly believed would
beneªt the licensing decisions of Transport and Fisheries (citing a
United Nations report to the effect that development and environ-
mental protection were compatible),199 the court found that the
guidelines’ “intrusion into provincial matters” was only “incidental” to
the “pith and substance” of the federal programs.200 Environmental
review was simply an instrument that helped focus the way these
agencies did business, and one that, the court stressed, only bound
them to a process and not to a particular result.201 If, in the end, the
Ministry of Transport or Fisheries chose to ignore an Environmental
Review Panel, it could do so. Of course, while technically correct, any
lawyer knows that process determines outcomes and that environ-
mental process could be used very effectively to change private and
government plans. The effect of the opinion, though, was to legiti-
mize Canadian federal environmental law, at least within the bounds
of established federal jurisdiction. The provinces would have to get
used to a new national order. As would the Minister of Environment,
now saddled with more responsibility than he ever wanted.
F. Requiem
There is no way the dam will ever be shut down.
—Ken Kowalski, Alberta Minister of Public Works, 1992 202
In May 1992, the Oldman Dam Environment Review Panel issued
its report.203 It was strong medicine. The adverse effects of the dam
would be severe, particularly on ªsheries, archeological sites, and the
Peigan culture. The provincial environmental review had been so
sketchy that conclusions on other environmental effects were not pos-
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sible to draw. The project had created great divisiveness, uprooted the
lives of displaced farmers, and its claimed need for increased irriga-
tion acreage had not been shown. Overall, the project was “not ac-
ceptable.”204 The ªrst and best option was to “decommission” it.205
Shades of the Alberta Environment Council report on Rafferty-
Alameda, ªfteen years earlier. And equally unavailing. Oldman Dam
at this point was 80% complete. Always quick with a quote, Alberta
Minister of Public Works Ken Kowalski (he had been promoted from
the provincial Environment Ministry; following the Supreme Court
ruling he had even called for the abolition of the Environment Minis-
try) labeled the Review Panel report “technically adolescent.”206 The
dam would be completed, he said, no matter what the Review Panel
did. He was correct.
Here, now, was the federal government, the Review Panel report
in hand calling for a decommissioning of Oldman Dam, the dam all
but completed and staring it in the face, and Alberta saying you’ll de-
commission Oldman over our dead body. Predictably, perhaps inevi-
tably under the circumstances, the federal Ministry blinked, asking
only that the province mitigate impacts on the Peigan and the
ªsheries.207 The Peigan negotiations would go on for years. The
ªsheries were another matter. Canadian biologists had predicted that
the dam would present an insurmountable obstacle to the prize spe-
cies of the region, the bull trout.208 Three years after the gates closed,
a magazine reported that Alberta’s remaining bull trout “teetered on
the brink of extinction.”209 Alberta reacted promptly. In May 1995 its
legislature proclaimed the bull trout one of the province’s “ofªcial
emblems.”210 Problem solved.
Milton Born With A Tooth was convicted on several counts of
ªrearms violations.211 He said he was ªring warning shots, in the air,
aiming to miss. The government insisted he shot at the Mounties. He
soon became a First Nation celebrity. The Grand Chief of the Assembly
of Manitoba Chiefs declared his people “supportive of the principals
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behind Milton’s actions to defend his territory and Mother Earth.”212
He continued: “The longer those in positions of power continue to
prioritize economic interests over environmental impacts, the closer we
move toward global destruction.”213 Born With a Tooth’s trial judge was
not impressed. Quite the opposite, he conducted the trial with such
overt hostility to the defense as to prompt an outcry from the press
and, eventually, a reprimand.214 And so Born With a Tooth, too, went
up on appeal, to have his conviction reversed and remanded for a new
trial, which was scrupulously fair, but he had ªred the shots, and that
was all it took to meet the allegations. He was sentenced to sixteen
months in jail, served twelve, and moved away. He had once said, “I’m
going to do it my way...if the valves [in the dam] are not open in the
next few days or weeks, they’d better kill me before I get home because
I’m willing to die for this.”215 He tried, he wasn’t killed, but he lost.
Come to think of it, in a sense he was killed too.
The Peigan came out a little better. In 2001 they changed their
name, rejecting the English version and reverting to their own pro-
nunciation, Piikan.216 Two years later they struck a settlement of their
claims against Alberta and the government of Canada for $64 million
in cash and an ongoing study on the future impacts of the dam on the
environment and the Piikan culture. They were training ªfteen of
their own tribe as environmental scientists, archeologists, and sociolo-
gists for the study.217 They were concerned for the long term. They
secured a re-opener of the cash settlement depending on the study
results. The dam was a fait accompli. The environment lost. But they
would win something important. Edwin Small Legs says, “I can tell you
this. If it hadn’t been for Milton and what he did, we would not have
that $64 million today.”218
The Province of Alberta had an answer to the bad press created
by the Environment Review Panel report. It planned a large public
ceremony to inaugurate Oldman Dam.219 Exercising his talent with
words once again, Alberta Minister Kowalski christened the event “A
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Festival of Life: A Celebration of Water.” In addition to the usual for-
malities, presided over by the provincial Premier, the four-day pro-
gram included “wild water rides, a children’s carnival, a canoe and
kayak whitewater competition . . . a 500-seat dinner for dignitaries, a
concert by Canada’s top country band . . . and a church service.”220
Martha Kostuch, no slouch for a phrase, had her own name for it: a
“festival of death, the death of three rivers.”221 She called up the
scheduled country band and asked, “Do you know what it is you are
celebrating?”222 The band cancelled. The Peigans refused to partici-
pate as well, not just the Loneªghters but the whole tribe. Kowalski
accused Kostuch of inciting violence. Milton Born With A Tooth did
not help matters by calling a radio show to declare his willingness to
lay down his life to stop the dam.
Minister Kowalski ªnally called off the ceremony, alleging a
criminal conspiracy. The Calgary Herald advised him to “put up or shut
up.”223 He did neither. Instead, in lieu of his public celebration, at
dawn on July 23, 1992 a squadron of sixteen ºag-bearing horsemen
galloped to the top of the dam where they were duly photographed
and memorialized. “[A] respectful afªrmation,” said the Alberta Re-
port, “of their support for water management in Southern Alberta and
their contempt for the threats of violence that have prevented a pub-
lic celebration.”224 Observed the Calgary Herald, it was “more like a
public relations attempt at damage control.”225 Years later Martha Kos-
tuch said that she thought it might be better to leave the dam stand-
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ing after all, as a “monument to government stupidity.”226 It would
make a bigger tourist attraction that way, she added.227
And so it ended at Oldman dam. Bitter to the last. Canadian en-
vironmental law was constitutional, but it had failed to catch the train.
III. Worlds Collide: The Great Whale
Quebec is a vast hydro-electric plant in the bud, and every day, mil-
lions of potential kilowatt hours ºow downhill and out to sea. What
a waste.
—Robert Bourassa, Premier, Quebec Province 228
In April 1971, the government of Quebec announced plans to
build one of the most massive construction works in the world in one of
the most untouched regions of the world, a vast complex of lakes, riv-
ers, tundra, and forests east of Hudson Bay called the Canadian Shield.
Designed in three phases, phase one would drain six entire rivers into
the La Grande River, doubling its ºow and funneling it towards an un-
derground powerhouse more than twice the size of the Notre Dame
Cathedral.229 Four powerline corridors would cut through hundreds of
miles of the forest to Montreal and, of considerable importance as
things turned out, to New York and New England as well.230 The La
Grande project required a thousand kilometers of access roads, four
main dams and 130 kilometers of dikes and reservoirs ºooding 8700
square kilometers, 5% of the land surface of the province and a much
higher percentage of its lakes and wetlands.231 By comparison, Rafferty-
Alameda and Oldman dams were mere pretenders.
La Grande was just the start. All three phases, when completed,
would consume twenty wild rivers and cover an area equal to the size
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of France.232 Even more spectacular was Quebec’s further dream of
damming off James Bay entirely with a 100 mile dike and sending its
waters to the western plains, as far away as California.233 The Province
stood to make a fortune. Better yet, none of these impacts would be
felt by Quebecois. The project was sited on the territory of the Cree
Indian Nation. Only nobody bothered to tell the Cree.234
The struggle that followed pitted two passionate antagonists, each
with its history of grievance and a struggle for self-determination. For
the next twenty years, the Canadian government was largely a by-
stander, a position it would ofªcially describe as alert neutrality.235 In
one corner of the ring stood Quebec, whose separate language, cul-
ture, and politics fed a near-constant quest for greater autonomy, if not
outright independence.236 Vive la Quebec Libre!, said at least in jest, at
times seriously, and often as a bargaining chip, has never been far from
the surface in Quebec City and Montreal. Few better ways than a hy-
droelectric power bonanza to provide an economic base for these and
more modest ambitions. And lest one forget, emerging from a history
of English dominance and alert for further insults, Quebecois were the
least prepared Canadians then or now to take directions from Ottawa.
These were Quebec’s projects. They would be built and guarded by its
alter ego, the James Bay Development Corporation.
In the opposite corner of the ring stood the largest and most
functionally-independent First Nation left on the North American
continent this side of Mexico.237 Northern Quebec east of James and
Hudson bays has been inhabited by the Cree since the glaciers re-
treated some 5000 years ago.238 Subgroups of Cree pushed south into
the swamps that line the American border and then west to the plains,
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displacing the Blackfoot and other tribes.239 They were entrepreneu-
rial with other tribes and then with Europeans. They trapped and
traded freely and, according to the explorer Mackenzie, one of the
ªrst Europeans to know them, they were sharp negotiators but “natu-
rally generous, good-tempered, and honest.”240 Catholic missionaries
a century later reported them “high in morality.”241 Depleted else-
where by white settlements and disease, the James Bay Cree remained
almost entirely on their own in the north woods, with its cold winters
and summer rains and legendary biting insects, intact and self
sufªcient, a hunting culture with a sophisticated ethic towards the
place they lived. The James Bay projects would challenge the Cree
ethic and independence, face on.
A. Planning by Surprise: La Grande
When the dams are built where will the animals go? The caribou
won’t know which way to go.
—Samson Nahacappa, hunter, Cree Nation 242
There were in fact three lawsuits, each one brought by the Cree
against the James Bay projects. They ªled the ªrst one in 1971,243 im-
mediately upon learning the Quebec government’s plans for the La
Grande and its watershed, two-ªfths of the Cree territory. The Cree
complaint was deceptively simple. These were their lands; Quebec
couldn’t just come and take them. They ended up in a provincial court
before provincial Judge Albert Malouf, whose middle-eastern back-
ground perhaps found more resonance with the plaintiffs than with the
many corporate and government attorneys.244 An Indian law expert by
the name of James O’Reilly represented the Cree, and in ªre and elo-
quence he was Irish to the bone.245 Lead attorney for Quebec was
Jacques LeBel, who by coincidence was the brother-in-law of Quebec
Premier Robert Bourassa, author and champion of the James Bay
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plan.246 It was an environmental case, but under a different name and a
different set of rules. The root issue was whose lands these were and
what the project was going to do to them. To the government it was no
contest, and they treated it that way: Canadian lands belonged to the
provinces and the impacts of the project would be beneªcial to every-
one, including the Cree.
The Cree case was an inextricable mix of history, religion and
ethics, all centered on the hunting way and its relation to the lands,
waters, and animals on which it depended. Today, we would use the
phrase “the environment” but, as the trial would reveal, no such word
began to convey the meaning of this relationship to the Cree. Frank
Speck, an early ethnographer, called Cree hunting a “religious occu-
pation.”247 A later researcher, Harvey Feit, set out in a doctoral thesis
to study one Cree hunting community on the shores of James Bay.248
He was suspicious, he later wrote, of popular images of these Indians
as either “ecological saints” or as “wanton over-exploiters.”249 What he
found was a complexity in the order of Catholic or Talmudic doctrine.
Hunting was the organizing principle of Cree life, and the word
itself had at least ªve separate meanings ranging from observing to ly-
ing in wait, from taking game and fetching, to growing and continuing
to grow.250 Every element in nature had its spirit, and the closest to
humans were animals, who had their own ethics and who, at appropri-
ate times, gave themselves up to humans to be killed. Successful hunt-
ers, Feit observed, demonstrated “competence because they maintain
that delicate balance with the world in which animals die and are re-
born in health and in continuing growth.” Over-harvested animal
populations became “angry” and denied the hunter. These were not
just words. For centuries Cree wardens had supervised individual hunt-
ing territories of more than a hundred square miles, monitoring the
game, advising the hunters, limiting the take, and reinforcing the ethic.
All the things that environmentalists would come to say about the in-
terconnectedness of life and its spiritual dimension, the Cree lived. But
not, perhaps, for very long. There never would be another collection of
witnesses like these. Brought in from the high woods, the Cree hunters
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and their families gave their testimonies and then wandered the streets
of the city, marveling at the trafªc, the height of the buildings, and the
volume of trash.251
To the whites, of course, all of this was incomprehensible. The
more so because the Cree witnesses spoke in several dialects and the
proceedings were conducted through translators into both English and
French.252 If one wanted to listen at all. One witness writes that it was a
“dialogue of the deaf” for the provincial and corporate lawyers, “who
began the case without really thinking it was necessary” and only woke
up to the fact that the judge was paying attention as the proceedings
wore on.253 Judge Malouf was respectful to the native witnesses, asking
one, whose answers had been cut short in cross-examination, if he had
ªnished his answer. “It’s ok,” said Billy Diamond, a Cree chief.254 “It’s
not ok,” the judge said, “If you have not ªnished it you will be given the
opportunity to ªnish it. That’s why we’re here.”255 After a few days of
testimony, he rejected the government’s motions to dismiss. There were
real issues here, he said.256
There were two real issues, one of law and one of fact. The legal
case was of ªrst impression and rather breathtaking: were these really
Cree’s lands? To the Cree, of course, the very idea of ownership was
counter-cultural. “It is quite ridiculous,” said Cree hunter Ronnie Jolly,
“this idea of the white man that a person can own all of the earth, and
everything under it, and everything that moves on it.”257 As was the idea
of money, particularly money in compensation for the loss of land. Wil-
liam Rat testiªed,
When you talk about money I do not really know the value of
it. I do not use it very often . . . . It is the white man who has
the money, and on the other hand, the Indian has the land.
The white man will always have the money, and will always
want to have the land.258
Losing the land would be “like losing my life,” he said.259 He meant, of
course, much more than land; he meant a relationship to the land as
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strange to the government attorneys who were examining him as a
relationship with Mars.
O’Reilly’s legal argument was that the Cree and other tribes had
always been protected by the English Crown, and that the settlers
were instructed as explicitly as in instructions from King George III to
the Canadian Governor in 1763 “not to disturb them in the Possession
of such Parts of the said province as they at present occupy or pos-
sess.”260 From then on, all acts of government from the Crown and
Quebec, including extension of the Province north to James Bay, were
done in recognition of “the rights of the Indian inhabitants,” subject
only to later, negotiated treaties.261 Which in this case had not taken
place. All of which, to O’Reilly, meant that the Cree had land rights.
These rights had been abrogated by the sudden, massive, and unan-
nounced James Bay plans.
The government’s primary defense, besides their conviction that
the Cree claims were unthinkable, was that the Cree had abandoned
their described lifestyle some time ago. And if they hadn’t, it was high
time they should. Wasn’t it a fact that the Cree used outboard motors
now?, asked the government attorneys. Yes, a Cree answered, but we
also go upriver by canoe.262 Don’t the Cree use ski-dos and snowmo-
biles? Yes, a Cree answered, but when people leave for their traplines
they still go by dogsled and wear snowshoes.263 What were the Cree
witnesses eating in Montreal . . . white man’s food, no? Answer: “I
have come to the stage that I can hardly eat this food.”264 Cree hunter
John Kawapit continued, “When I go back home to Great Whale River
I’ll be able to eat better, because I will be eating the food that I have
been eating in the past.”265 But were they telling the truth? One forty-
two-year-old Cree hunter had been called in by his Chief to testify
about the effects of a James Bay access road across his trapline. In the
courtroom he was asked to put his hand on the bible and swear to tell
                                                                                                                     
It can never be that there will be enough money to help pay for what I get
from trapping. I do not think in terms of money. I think more often of the
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the truth. A long dialogue with the translator ensued. “He does not
know whether he can tell the truth,” the translator told the judge. “He
can tell only what he knows.”266
The government’s main witness was an anthropologist who said
that the Cree culture described was on the verge of collapse.267 He
gave it seven years, maximum. And, for the Cree’s own good, the
sooner that they adapted to the white man’s ways the better. To be
sure, “bringing up 16,000 whites” into the middle of the Cree society,
for conjunction of a project of this size, “the shock [was] going to be
brutal.”268 But it was perhaps “the only way to make a culture react,”
and then “really begin to participate” and “take its development in
hand.”269 The Cree’s anthropological witness, the above-mentioned
Harvey Feit, held a different view.270 Feit, who had lived with the Cree
for several years, described a struggling but still self-sustaining culture.
In fact he saw considerable potential for adding more Crees to the
subsistence hunting culture. If these people were to adapt successfully
to the white man’s life, he said, it would have to be incrementally and
over time. A sudden shock would destroy them.
The shock came instead from Judge Malouf. Capturing seventy-
eight days of testimony from 167 witnesses, and after several months
of deliberation, his 170 page opinion found as a matter of law that
England and then Canada had always treated the Indians as sover-
eigns of their land and undertook to possess their lands by treaties or
other negotiations, not by simple appropriation.271 While Native con-
ceptions of property ownership differed from that of the whites, they
had their own rules and legally protected rights. On the facts, he cred-
ited the Cree witnesses and several supporting scientists, who testiªed
to severe disruption of the culture and livelihoods by even the access
roads and preliminary construction works. In a detailed (seventy
page) summary of the evidence, he documented the “dependence of
the indigenous population on the animals, ªsh and vegetation in the
territory,” on which the works would have “devastating and far reach-
ing effects.”272 Seeing the law, facts, and equities so plain, he found
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that the loss of the Cree way of life “far outweigh[ed]” the monetary
losses to the corporations. He enjoined the project.273
Quebec’s response was disbelief, then deªance. With the eager
assistance of an inºamed media, it presented itself as the victim of a
robbery with catastrophic losses of income, jobs, and a secure future.274
It accelerated project construction. (Have we seen this before?) The
weekend following the stop order, with work proceeding apace, it im-
posed a news embargo on the area; pilots who ºew reporters in to see
what was going on would lose their licenses.275 The James Bay Corpo-
ration rushed to ªle its appeal and to stay Judge Malhouf’s injunc-
tion.276 Within days the appellate court heard the stay motion. They
had questions only for attorney O’Reilly, none for the government,
and the tenor was not friendly. (Opening question: “Well, Maitre
O’Reilly, what have you got to say?”).277 Within ªve hours the stay was
lifted. A Cree appeal to the Supreme Court died.278 The construction
continued to roll. Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Alberta were all read-
ing out of the same playbook: construction beats law. Then fate took a
hand.
Throughout the winter and in extreme cold, construction stalled
at the primary dam site.279 Two rival unions had a falling out. After a
series of minor ºare-ups, a group of workers seized some bulldozers
and other heavy equipment and rammed it into the power plant.
Then they set it on ªre. The company was forced to ºy the entire crew
out, 1400 men. The work stopped for months. Asked by a reporter for
his reaction to these events, a local Cree said, “If you don’t quote me,
I’ll tell you; it sure as hell beats an injunction.”
The respite was short-lived. By the next summer the appeals court
was ready to hear the James Bay Corporation’s case and rule. It was
aided by two compendious briefs, in four volumes, two from each
side.280 The one that they evidently read more closely was from James
Bay. In this brief, and in the court’s opinion which was in large part in-
distinguishable from it, the Canadian Shield was not the homeland of
Cree Nation but, rather, the Quebec frontier already settled by whites
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and in need of their improvement.281 The Cree life described by Judge
Malhouf was ancient history. Justice Turgeon, writing the main opinion
for the court, agreed with the corporation on “the lack of importance
of country food in the diet of the Indians,” who ate “as do people in-
habiting the urban centres.”282 He found that “a considerable number
of [Cree] occupy interesting jobs” and did not “give themselves over to
hunting and ªshing except [for] recreation.”283 The James Bay project
would provide a “salutary shock” to these people and “help in the
elaboration of the necessary policies of transformation.”284 The Justice
chided the trial court for failing to “see in the proof all that these
conºicts could bring of a positive nature.”285 Positive to the environ-
ment, as well. Far from drowning out ªsh and wildlife, the dams and
reservoirs would actually increase wildlife populations and spare them
the hazards of uncontrolled nature and ºooding.286 As for native rights
to the land and its resources, they simply did not exist and never had,
not since the King’s ªrst charter to the Hudson Bay Company.287 Judg-
ment reversed.
The Cree’s ªrst lawsuit failed in court, but its attendant publicity
succeed in prompting the government to negotiate terms for the now
inevitable La Grande phase of the James Bay development.288 With the
construction in full swing and no leverage from the law, the Cree were
under enormous pressure to take whatever they could get.289 Chief Billy
Diamond later explained, “we saw the need to limit the damages, seek
remedial works and have certain fundamental rights recognized . . . .
We really had no other choice.”290 The government added pressures of
its own. Again, Chief Diamond: “not only did the negotiators come in
with [surrender of land claims] as a condition which was not subject to
discussion or debate, but Canada made it clear that if we did not pro-
ceed with the agreement process, unilateral legislation would have
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been imposed on us in any case.”291 Nor were the pressures limited to
future threats. In November 1993, the Grand Council of the Cree ex-
plained, “the position of our people was desperate, and programs upon
which we depended were being cut and frozen, including while nego-
tiations were underway.” Against this backdrop, it is remarkable that
the Cree walked away with anything at all.292
What they walked away with was the James Bay Northern Quebec
Agreement, ratiªed by the Cree Nation (described as “very reluctant”)
and the Canadian Parliament. The agreement extinguished native land
claims in return for the creation of small, Cree-owned reserves and a
$225 million payout.293 The Cree maintained hunting rights and, under
state supervision, their own regulatory scheme.294 The La Grande proj-
ect would go forward, but the location of its major power plant would
be moved one rapid upstream, saving a historic Cree rendezvous of
central cultural and religious importance.295 No other project
modiªcations were obtained. No river would be spared.
And so, the project described by Quebec Premier Bourassa as a
“conquest” of the Canadian North296 went forward. Twenty years later
a brochure of Hydro Quebec, the $34 billion utility charged with real-
izing this conquest, urged the reader to “Follow the Energy Road!,”
where “You will experience the inªnite landscapes and brilliant skies
where thousands of Quebec workers built the La Grande complex.”297
Thousands of Quebec workers but very few Cree.298 As of 1991 only
ªve residents of the town of La Grande worked for Hydro-Quebec.299
Half the town was unemployed, and the entire population suffered
from “alarming rates of alcohol abuse, teenage pregnancy, divorce,
and suicide.”300 The hydro dams had also converted harmless forms of
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mercury, leached from the trees and soils, into to methyl mercury,
toxic to ªsh and humans.301 By 1984, a study of the Cree community
of Chisasibi, downstream from the La Grande complex, found 64% of
the residents carried methyl mercury levels above the toxic thresh-
old.302 Hydro-Quebec responded by telling the Cree to eat less ªsh.303
Asked about the positive impacts of the project on the community,
Sappa Fleming, the former Mayor of the Inuit population in Great
Whale, said, “Well, my children can choose from six different kinds of
potato chips at the Northern [grocery store] . . . I suppose that is a
kind of progress.”304
The same brand of progress came to the wildlife of the region.
When the massive sluices and diversions opened in the 1980s, 10,000
caribou drowned making the crossing in the modiªed and unfamiliar
waters.305 Migration patterns throughout the region were scrambled.
One old-timer said, “The geese have lost their way.”306
The ªrst Cree lawsuit against the James Bay development had two
other impacts not lost on the Cree or anyone else. The ªrst was to
politicize a loose grouping of tribes and family groups into a central-
ized Cree Council with allies in politics, international assemblies, and
the rising environmental community. The second was to underline
the need for legal leverage and to ªnd it beyond Indian claims in the
emerging ªeld of environmental law. The cases to come would be
based on the same claims raised in the Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman
dam cases. Once again, Canada would claim no responsibility for the
projects. Indeed, it would claim no responsibility under the James Bay
Northern Quebec Agreement either. These claims would be put to
the test as Quebec now moved to phase two of the James Bay devel-
opment, Great Whale.
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B. Great Whale I
[T]he central question about the Great Whale Basin is this: Should
large parts of it be underwater?
—Sam Howe Verhovek, The New York Times
The Great Whale is a special river even by Canadian standards, an
entire country of special rivers. It inspires poetry out of hard-nosed
journalists and scientists alike. One reporter writes,
As the Great Whale river rises east out of Hudson Bay in
northeastern Canada, its broad sandy shores quickly give way
to a carpet of light-green lichen studded with granite outcrop-
pings. Beyond the banks lies a vast expanse of black spruce
and tamarack, great coniferous forests, broken here and there
by lakes and bogs and kettle ponds.307
It is a landscape that teems with life in fall and spring, he continues,
“when enormous herds of caribous stomp across the earth and mil-
lions of migratory birds tarry in the estuaries of James and Hudson
Bays, some stopping to double their weight as they feast on eelgrass
and coastal shrimp before ºying as far south as Tierra del Fuego.”308 It
is also one of the least studied landscapes in North America, one of
the farthest from urban centers and universities, but this much is
known: “With its many rapids and falls, and its canyons and cliffs, it is
a spectacularly beautiful river.”309
With one extra twist. The conºuence of the Little Whale River
and James Bay is a gathering ground for Beluga Whales—“small, strik-
ingly white creatures” against blue water that return every summer.310
They do not come to calve or feed but to rub off their old skins on
the shallow rocks and “frolic” in the surf. Hence the name. Only the
Beluga no longer come to the mouth of the Great Whale. They were
wiped out of this migration years earlier by the Hudson Bay Company.
But several hundred Beluga come to the mouth of the Little Whale
River, which would be eliminated by the James Bay development proj-
ect, phase two.
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The Great Whale project began for the Cree exactly as the La
Grande had. Without notice.311 But not by surprise, because back from
political exile to lead the province of Quebec once again was Robert
Bourassa. His passion for the project had not changed. Nor had his atti-
tude towards the Cree. As he explained to the press, “conquerors are
not courteous.”312 A Cree summary of the battle that followed notes
that, “in 25 years of dealing with us, he never once, not even to the day
he died, visited a Cree village.”313 Nor had the project changed its pos-
ture towards the environment. One historian writes: “That the James
Bay rivers should be turned to electricity to feed the world’s hungriest
and greediest energy markets and that James Bay itself should become
the continent’s water tank” was, in Quebec’s view, “rational and inevita-
ble.”314 A consultant for the project company explained, “In my view,
nature is awful, and what we do is cure it.”315
The Cree were not going to take this one lying down any more
than they had the last. “We would like to avoid violence,”316 said Bill
Namagoose. “It gets you a lot of publicity, but you can’t eat publicity.
We don’t want to lose our land.”317 They elected a new Grand Chief,
Matthew Coon-Come, a young, slim, and passionate man with a ºair
for oratory and a mandate to stop the hydroelectric development.318
Quebec professed surprise, arguing that the Cree had, in the James
Bay Agreement, accepted that “these known projects and any addi-
tions or substantial modiªcations to Le Complex La Grande” shall be
considered as “subject to the environmental regime only in respect to
ecological impacts” and that “sociological factors or impacts” would
not be grounds for the Cree to “oppose or prevent the said develop-
ments.”319 To which the Cree replied that this surrender of claims ap-
plied only to La Grande, phase one, and not the phases to come.320
And further, even if otherwise, the entire Agreement was void for the
above-mentioned duress, throw in fraud, misrepresentation, and non-
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fulªllment by Canada of its part of the bargain.321 Whatever the merits
of these positions, they put all the more weight on the forthcoming
environmental review.
Familiarly, by now, Quebec was determined to keep whatever envi-
ronmental review was necessary at home and ªrmly under its thumb.
Hydro-Quebec’s ªrst move was to split the project in two parts—(1) the
main power projects and (2) the access and logistical support (roads,
airports, construction camps)—and then offer an assessment of part
one only, thereby avoiding consideration of the whole.322 Both Quebec
and federal authorities approved.323 Once the Hydro-Quebec assess-
ment was made, under the Quebec process members of environmental
review committees did not get to ask their own questions for the com-
pany to answer.324 One observer commented, “They were like people
judging a job candidate on the basis of her answers to her own ques-
tions.”325 Better yet for Hydro-Quebec, questions of the need for the
project, its purposes, alternatives, and basic design were not on the ta-
ble either.326 Only those measures to attenuate project impacts were
germane.327 The cheapest of which was paying money. The company
had paid the Cree upwards of $100 million to expand their project at
La Grande.328 Then, they said, even for the Cree it’s all about money.
The Cree replied that there was no reason not to take it: Hydro-Quebec
had destroyed the La Grande river by that point anyway.329
To both sides, though, the main chance was the new $12.6 billion
project on the Great Whale River and its tributaries, the most north-
ern of the three phases of the James Bay project, involving hundreds
of kilometers of new roads and power lines, three new power stations,
ªve new reservoirs, and ºooding 4400 more square kilometers of
lands and waters.330 Faithful to the game plan that had proven so suc-
cessful in Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman, Hydro-Quebec let bids for
the clearing of the main access road.331 The question was whether
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(the desires of Quebec and Hydro-Quebec notwithstanding) any of
this would receive federal environmental review. And if so, so what?
The ªrst answer to the ªrst question was: yes. Canadian Minister of
Environment Lucien Bouchard, a Quebecois as well but one who had
been scorched by his ineffectual responses in the previous dam cases,
admitted federal jurisdiction.332 In October 1989, he wrote to his pro-
vincial counterpart that, given the “considerable magnitude of this pro-
ject,” it was “extremely important” that the assessment be conducted “as
objectively and independently as possible,” and offered a “cooperative
approach.”333 Nothing, of course, was further from Quebec’s mind. In
the best tradition of the provinces, it did not even reply. One month
later Bouchard tried again, this time to the newly-appointed provincial
environmental minister.334 Nothing back. Meanwhile, Federal Adminis-
trator of the James Bay Development, Ray Robinson, wrote the Hydro-
Quebec vice president for environmental affairs and reiterated that the
project was subject to federal environmental review as speciªed by the
provisions of the James Bay Agreement.335 As the court later notes,
“[a]n extensive period of silence then prevails.”336 One full year later,
Robinson wrote to the president of the evaluation committee responsi-
ble for monitoring the James Bay development, again outlining the
federal responsibilities that necessitated federal environmental re-
view.337 He again wrote Hydro-Quebec to the same effect as well.338 At
which point he appears to have undergone Miraculous Conversion.
That same month, November 1990, Federal Administrator
Robinson suddenly informed a Cree audience that he had no man-
date for federal environmental review.339 One might forgive the Cree
for feeling, once again, betrayed. They ªled suit. Back went James
O’Reilly to court on their behalf.340 And ran into another Judge Mal-
houf.
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Unlike the La Grande case, federal Judge Rouleau was not un-
duly inºuenced by a year of testimony and reºection.341 Nonetheless,
his sympathy for the plaintiffs emerges from his recitation of the facts,
which read like a chronicle of government bullying and lies.342 The
Cree claim was that sections twenty-two and twenty-three of the James
Bay Agreement required the appointment of a federal administrator
to supervise the environmental impact of future development and to
set up independent evaluation committees “if the development is to
have any signiªcant impact” on the native people or wildlife resources
of the territory.343 And so the sections read as an exact replica of the
EARP guideline process. “I doubt,” noted Judge Rouleau dryly, “that
anyone can suggest that the Great Whale phase of the James Bay proj-
ect will not ‘interfere with wildlife and its habitat, resulting in drastic
changes to the traditional way of life.’”344 Of course, Hydro-Quebec
was not ready to concede any such thing and had already once mar-
shaled an army of witnesses and lawyers to say so.345 Denial of impacts
was not, however, its main defense. Instead it was denial of the
Agreement.
Simply put, Quebec and Hydro-Quebec argued, apparently with a
straight face, that the Agreement was not law. It was only a contract,
never a statute, and contracts are not enforceable in federal court.346
When it came to dealing with First Nations, the white man’s promises
seemed to hold little more water north of the border than they had in
the United States. Judge Rouleau, however, read the Agreement the
other way. The Parliament, he wrote, in approving the Agreement,
clearly required certain conduct of federal ofªcials, including the
Federal Administrator Robinson.347 Even if the law were unclear, the
court continued, “the sovereign’s intention must be clear and plain if
it is to extinguish aboriginal rights.”348 The court concluded, in terms
that would have gladdened Judge Malhouf’s heart as much as it dark-
ened others in Montreal and Ottawa:
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I feel a profound sense of duty to respond favorably. Any
contrary determination would once again provoke, within
the native groups, a sense of victimization by white society
and its institutions. This agreement was signed in good faith
for the protection of the Cree and Inuit peoples, not to de-
prive them of their rights and territories without due con-
sideration.349
Having found federal jurisdiction, the rest was short work. The
government’s attempt to bury the environmental review at the provin-
cial level was “intended both to appease [local authorities] and circum-
vent the native populations” and appeared to have been negotiated by
the governments “in an attempt to free themselves” from the responsi-
bilities of federal review.350 The federal government’s argument, fur-
ther, that it had no responsibility to act until Hydro-Quebec submitted
its assessment for review was, in the court’s view, “entirely spurious;”
Hydro-Quebec could, by this logic, simply withhold its assessment, a
“ludicrous result.”351 Pointing out that federal review could not, as with
the EARP guideline order, enjoin the project, Judge Rouleau expressed
his astonishment that the government would resist it: “[I]f one accepts
the federal government’s argument that it is willing to comply with its
obligations towards the native people of this country, one is at a loss to
understand its refusal to fulªll that original contractual obligation” in
the James Bay Agreement.352 One can sense the anger. The implication
was clear. The federal government, however, facing a hostile Quebec,
was by no means anxious to fulªll its obligations towards the Cree or
anyone else. The government, of course, appealed.
The appellate opinion was long, technical, and focused nearly
exclusively on the question of federal jurisdiction.353 At journey’s end,
it wound up where Judge Rouleau had: Great Whale was subject to
federal environmental review. At long last, embarrassed by the press,
castigated by the courts, mocked by the provinces, reeling from the
after-effects of its timidity in Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman dams,
dragged into the ring with its heel marks all the way down the aisle, in
July 1991, the Canadian Environment Ministry announced that if
Quebec did not want to cooperate the federal government would
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conduct the review of the Great Whale project on its own.354 Softening
its punch, it added that it could not guarantee that Quebec would de-
lay construction until the environmental ªndings were released.355
Even this concession was not enough for Quebec’s Energy Minister,
who told reporters that the province would “never submit” to Ottawa’s
procedure, adding that what the federal government was doing was
“illegal.”356 Illegal or court-ordered, below the bluffs and threats, the
federals were now in the game and the time, information, and project
delays obtained in their review would prove critical for the Cree.
C. Great Whale II
We wish we had never signed the James Bay Agreement. Its terms
have not been honored. You might as well just put a stone around
our necks and drown us in the reservoirs.
—Matthew Coon-Come, Grand Chief, Cree Nation 357
In spring 1990, one the strangest processions of the century
made its way by water and truck down from the Inuit and Cree villages
along James Bay, south to Montreal, and then down the Hudson River
to New York City.358 It was the brainchild of a U.S. kayaker named
Denny Alsop who had canoed rivers on the Canadian shield now to be
ºooded by the James Bay project.359 One angry American. At his sug-
gestion, the Cree and Inuit built a new kind of boat with the bow of
an Indian canoe and the stern of an Eskimo kayak, to which they gave
the hybrid name Odeyak. On April 20, Earth Day, with press boats fol-
lowing and helicopters overhead, the Odeyak, supporting canoes and
sixty Cree and Inuit, reached Times Square. First to speak was Mathew
Coon-Come. “Hydroelectric development is ºooding the land, de-
stroying wildlife and killing our people,” he said.360 They would
change Hydro-Quebec’s world.
The environmental review mandated by Cree II now unfolded on
two fronts, each feeding the other and making life increasingly
difªcult for the Great Whale project. One was in Canada, where Hy-
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dro-Quebec and its allies hoped to complete the process within a
year.361 Instead, the Cree and other opponents packed the “scoping”
meetings that deªned the review362 which, now federal, was not bound
by Quebec’s will-of-the-applicant standard. The assessment rules that
emerged were exigent, requiring, among other things, consultation
with the Cree and Inuit communities. Hydro-Quebec cobbled to-
gether 5000 pages of studies going back to the ªrst litigation, and, in
its haste, gave short shrift to the consultation. Its environmental as-
sessment would end up before three independent review committees,
two under the Federal Administrator and established by the James Bay
Agreement and the third under the Ministry of Environment and the
EARP guidelines order. The corporation demanded a response within
forty-ªve days. The summer construction season was passing and loans
were pending. Time was not on Hydro’s side.
There was a fourth venue, however. It could not have been an-
ticipated by anyone, and it proved dispositive. Much of the market for
the Great Whale project lay south of the border in the New England
states.363 Americans had always been big players in Canadian hydroe-
lectric projects; in fact they owned the ªrst ones outright, and U.S.
lenders ªnanced much of the La Grande works, phase one.364 In the
late 1980s, Hydro-Quebec signed power sale contracts with Vermont
and Maine, but the big one was an “agreement in principle” for
twenty-one years of supply to the New York Power Authority.365 The
New York contract was predicted to meet 6% of the state’s total en-
ergy needs by the end of the century and bring up to $40 billion in
revenue to Hydro-Quebec.366  The project cost about that much to
build. Which is to say that New York held the cards. And its agreement
was only “in principle.”
Opposition to the Great Whale project along the southern tier
began not with its impacts on the distant Cree but with the arrival of
gigantic transmission corridors across the towns and dairy farms of
Quebecois along the American border.367 People feared the power
lines, their size, sight, magnetic ªelds, and the herbicides needed to
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maintain them. They learned about them not from Hydro-Quebec
but from American groups and newspapers. Raising these questions
they found the company “arrogant” and “contemptuous of the pub-
lic;” they “tried to mislead.” The allegations had a familiar ring. Coali-
tions of consumers, churches, unions, and environmental and native
peoples groups began to oppose the project. They set up an ofªce in
Montreal. Below the border, a group of residents calling themselves
PROTECT (Prudent Residents Opposed to Electrical Cable Transmis-
sion) formed to oppose a line across the New York countryside. No
Thank Q Hydro-Quebec campaigned against the lines in Maine and
then, breakthrough, succeeded in persuading state legislators to re-
ject the Hydro contract for failure to consider cheaper options such as
energy efªciency.
Then, in New York, the wheels came off. Organizations of every
stripe, singly and in coalitions, began to lobby politicians to cancel the
New York Power Authority agreement.368 At one point there were at
least thirty anti-Great Whale groups on college campuses throughout
New York State, and more elsewhere across the Northeast. To Hydro-
Quebec and its supporters, Great Whale electricity was a no-brainer
for New York: “clean” power, no air emissions, good rates, long term
stability.369 But the opponents raised a larger moral question: was this
source clean, or, in the words of a New York reporter, “simply tanta-
mount to exporting environmental and cultural destruction to the
taiga”?370 Hydro-Quebec’s campaign featured pictures of its employ-
ees “carefully airlifting animals to safety from islands created by the
ºooding.”371 They didn’t persuade one Buffalo politician, who spoke
for many when he said that New York should avoid becoming “an ac-
complice to the crime.”372 And then the Cree, Inuit, and Mathew
Coon-Come appeared in Times Square.
At this point, the Hydro-Quebec ball was no longer in Canada’s
court; it was in Albany with then-Governor Mario Cuomo. The New
York Power Authority had already ºexed its muscle with the company.
In a letter to the New York Times, the Authority’s Chairman related:
“Largely at my urging Hydro-Quebec agreed not to begin construc-
tion of roads and other ancillary features until the entire project has
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undergone review.”373 He continued: “I have personally advised Hy-
dro-Quebec that we will not buy a single kilowatt of its power unless
environmental and native peoples’ concerns receive full scrutiny un-
der Canadian procedures.”374 In a single stroke, the New York Power
Authority had succeeded in accomplishing what the Canadian Minis-
try of Environment had been unable to do in three tries from Rafferty
to Oldman to Great Whale, and it was the most obvious step in the
world: stop construction pending environmental review. In late 1992,
Governor Cuomo cancelled the $22.7 billion twenty-one-year agree-
ment to buy Hydro-Quebec power, citing lack of future power de-
mands.375 He had become a believer in “least cost,” demand-side
management: energy efªciency instead.376
A year-and-a-half later, with the Great Whale still alive and under
Canadian review, a third Cree lawsuit came down from the Canadian
Supreme Court.377 Hydro-Quebec not only needed U.S. purchasers, it
needed the all-clear from the Canadian National Energy Board to ex-
port the electricity.378 The Board’s mandate, inter alia, required a
ªnding that the electricity was not needed to meet Canada’s own power
demands in the foreseeable future.379 The licensing process began in
the late 1980s and, while it was in progress, the Canadian Parliament,
conveniently for Hydro-Quebec, repealed this “Canada ªrst” require-
ment, leaving only a highly discretionary standard that the sale be in
“the public interest.”380 Vague standards like this are usually a joy to the
regulated community. They release the regulators from pressures of law
and subject them all the more to the pressures of politics.
In this case, though, the Energy Board did not give Hydro-Quebec
carte blanche. The Cree and environmental groups had intervened in
the proceeding to challenge the company’s beneªt-cost analysis and
the Board’s exercise of its ªduciary duties towards native peoples.381
They lost on these claims but won a huge concession: the Board at-
tached conditions to its license that required compliance with the
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EARP guidelines and successful completion of that review process.382
Further, the scope of the environmental review would include not sim-
ply the transmission lines carrying the power out of Canada but also
the “future construction of production facilities.”383 As the Board
noted, the transmission impacts were minor;384 the production impacts
were huge. Another review nightmare for Hydro-Quebec. It appealed,
and won before a friendly appellate court.385 The inclusion of the pro-
duction facilities was seen as beyond the Board’s jurisdiction and ultra
vires.386 And so it was the turn of the intervener Cree and environ-
mental organizations to appeal. They were joined by the U.S.-based Si-
erra Club Legal Defense Fund and Friends of the Earth.387 And ulti-
mately, by the Supreme Court of Canada.
In March 1994, a unanimous opinion had little difªculty ªnding
a relationship between the licensing of export and the production of
the electricity to be exported. To exclude the production would deni-
grate the environmental review process. “I would ªnd it surprising,”
wrote the lead author, “that such an elaborate review process would
be created for such a limited inquiry [as the transmission lines
only].”388 But lurking beneath this argument was the one that has
continued to haunt all of Canadian environmental law: did such a
broad exercise of federal authority by the Energy Board contravene
the basic, decentralized structure of the Constitution Act of 1867?
Here the court did a lawyerly thing. It said that it would “expressly re-
frain” from “making any determinations” that interpreted the Consti-
tution in this regard.389 Next, it proceeded to do so.
“It must be recognized,” began the court with some understate-
ment, “that the environment is not an independent matter of legisla-
tion” under the Constitution, and that it is a “constitutionally abstruse
matter which does not comfortably ªt within the existing division of
powers without considerable overlap and uncertainty.”390 When some-
one starts using the word “abstruse,” one senses thin ice. The court had
to be “careful,” it went on, “to ensure that the Board’s authority is truly
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limited to matters of federal concern.”391 The Oldman question, redux.
The court explained: “That does not artiªcially limit the scope of the
inquiry to the environmental ramiªcations of the transmission of
power by a line of wire”—a statement which is up to this point clear—
“but it equally does not permit a wholesale review of the entire opera-
tional plan of Hydro-Quebec.”392 Which at this point is not clear at all.
If the review does not include the entire plan, then how much of it? If
the federal statutory authority extended to the lines and export, then
how far into the access roads, power plants, and mercury toxins could
the Energy Board go? Without offering an answer, the court concluded
that the Board decision and its environmental conditions, which in-
cluded consideration of future project construction, “struck an appro-
priate balance between these two extremes.”393 Court to federal agen-
cies: we really have no idea how to reconcile federal environmental
review with the Constitution. But what you’re doing here looks okay.
The court was even more equivocal when it came to the question
of moving forward on a project while the review was taking place.
Here, it stressed that the EARP guidelines did not require the board
“to suspend its decision-making until the environmental assessment of
all future generating facilities is completed” (emphasis added).394
Which left unanswered the question of suspending some of the future
facilities, the more imminent ones. Wringing its hands much as the
Environment Ministry itself had over the same issue, the court noted
that it was “preferable” to treat the environmental concerns before
proceeding.395 Rather than insist on it as a matter of law (and com-
mon sense, to say nothing of the preservation of the court’s jurisdic-
tion as well), however, the opinion simply approved the Energy
Board’s retention of authority to cancel the licenses if its conditions
were not met.396 All of which meant that, under Canadian law, Hydro-
Quebec remained free to march forward at its own peril, loading the
equities in its favor through contract commitments and sunk costs. It
would sink $400 million.397
The indirection and caution of the Supreme Court’s opinion not-
withstanding, Cree III complicated matters enormously for the com-
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pany. Yet another venue for environmental review, intervention, and
delay. Hydro-Quebec tried to put on a brave face, “as long as the Su-
preme Court hasn’t canceled any of our contracts, we are satisªed,”
said its President Armand Couture,398 but the interest on its borrowed
millions was making its “cheap” electricity more and more expensive.399
Then, in mid-November of 1994, all three Canadian environmental re-
view boards reported in. Their conclusion: Hydro-Quebec’s hastily-
assembled environmental assessment was not in compliance with the
EARP guidelines.400 The company would have to go back to square one.
That was a very long way back.
The next afternoon, the Premier of Quebec, faced with the loss
of his U.S. customers, mounting opposition, and the added obstacle
of new environmental reviews, threw in the towel. He announced the
abandonment of the Great Whale project.401 He said he had never
been in favor of it anyway.402
D. Another Requiem: The Rupert-Broadback-Nottoway
I’ve fought them for seven years, hand-to-hand combat, every day,
week after week, to preserve our river. You can imagine how I feel
now.
—Cree negotiator, 2001 403
Stories like this should have an end, but they never do. Enor-
mous amounts of money ªnd their way like water, and there is no
holding them back. Perhaps the most destructive phase of all the
James Bay projects was yet to come. Phase three planned to divert the
ºow of the Nottoway and Rupert Rivers, legendary white waters and
historic routes of the fur trade, into the Broadback River, storing the
water in seven new reservoirs, sending it through eleven powerhouses,
and transforming the lower portions of the Nottoway and Rupert
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(“one of the most magniªcent wild rivers in Canada”)404 into dry
rock.405
Compared to the impacts of the Great Whale and even the La
Grande, these would be far more severe.406 The shallow reservoirs
would ºood about twice the area as those proposed on the Great
Whale, and they and their associated roads, power lines, dikes, and di-
versions would destroy more southern and biologically important wild-
lands.407 Inundating more vegetation, the reservoirs would also release
more toxic methyl mercury downstream. These were prime ªsheries
and core habitat for moose, caribou, beaver, and other species on
which the Cree depended. The access roads would also open more for-
est for penetration by loggers, miners, trappers, oil, and gas and a host
of white-owned development from the south. The majority of the Cree
lived in this zone. Most of their villages and hunting grounds were here.
The lands along the Rupert and Nottoway were the “veritable heartland
of the Cree way of life.”408
The Cree resisted. When Hydro-Quebec ofªcials came to the
mouth of the Rupert River to sell the village of Waskaganish on a joint
venture this time, sharing some of the Rupert diversion proªts, they
were “put into a canoe and hustled out of town.”409 But the money was
huge. And the Cree were living with, by their estimate, the loss of $5
billion a year in their own resources from the La Grande and associ-
ated projects, for which they were receiving next to nothing in re-
turn.410 The interest on resistance compounded daily.
In October 2001, after more than thirty years of ªghting the
James Bay projects in total and ten on the Rupert-Broadback-
Nottoway, the Cree capitulated.411 In a deal hauntingly reminiscent of
the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement twenty years earlier that
had unleashed the La Grande project and extinguished Cree claims
in return for a cash payment, relocation of one dam and joint man-
agement authority over wildlife,412 Quebec and Hydro-Quebec did it
again. It is hard, it is indeed impossible, to blame the Cree. Still living
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on the margins and largely deprived of the assumed beneªts of both
the earlier Agreement and the hydro development, they were at the
end of their tether.413 The promised community development hadn’t
happened. Very few Cree had been trained and employed with the
companies. The cash payment proved inadequate. Then it ran out. At
the same time, more roads, mining, timber cuts, and development
kept spilling up from the south, from which the Cree were getting no
cut at all. As one of the Cree negotiators explained the settlement, “I
feel it is about 51 percent a good idea, and 49 percent bad.”414
This time the Cree received more autonomy and more money.
They assumed authority over wildlife management and community
development. And an annual cash payment rising to $70 million for
the next ªfty years. Cheap for Hydro-Quebec, which, in the end, as a
state monopoly, would not have to pay for it anyway. Huge money for
an entire people on the brink. Which way did responsibility lie? Other
provisions appeared cosmetic. Under the announced forest regime,
25% of Cree traplines would not be cut, and the rest managed by
“mosaic” cutting, the kind of habitat fragmentation that dooms deep
woods species. In the U.S. experience, once logging roads go in, min-
ing, off road recreation, poaching, and the rest follow like wagon
trains. The Cree would get the money. They would lose the land.
Quebec left nothing to chance. The Cree agreed to drop all law-
suits and not to bring any more lawsuits against the province to en-
force its obligations under the James Bay Agreement. The Cree not
only gave up their heartland, they gave up their law. A Quebec north-
ern expert, Louis-Edmond Hamelin, later commented: “nothing in
this document indicates that each side has understood the culture of
the other.”415
IV. Reºections on Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman and
the Great Whale
It is difªcult at long range, even presumptuous, for an American
to draw conclusions about cases in another legal system, another web
of cultures, and another set of assumptions about the way things work
and ought to work. The task is better done in this case by Canadian
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scholars, and they do it every day. There is some value, nonetheless, in
offering a comparative view of these same issues from another system,
particularly one largely identical to Canada in language, in economic
and social development, and in the same struggle to come to grips
with environmental law. The United States experience with water pro-
jects goes back more than a century, and with environmental impact
review to 1969. This author’s personal experience with both, as a liti-
gator and scholar, goes back to 1971. The political shenanigans, eva-
sions of responsibility, and half-hearted compliance noted in this brief
history are found throughout American environmental law, never
more so than the current day,416 and the American treatment of its
native peoples is one of its greater disgraces. In short, the United
States has little to preach or teach here. What this author hopes to
offer is a more modest reºection on what these particular cases say
about how Canada and the United States approach environmental
responsibilities.
(1) Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman and the James Bay Development
litigation propelled Canada into modern environmental law and one
of its primary mechanisms, environmental impact review. Prior to
these cases, Canada had an opaque administrative order of uncertain
application and even less certain enforcement, overlaid on a constitu-
tional system which cast serious doubt on whether the federal gov-
ernment could be doing this at all. Starting with Rafferty, these doubts
were put to rest, at ªrst in theory and then in practice. As they were
put to rest, the public clamor for a greater federal role emboldened
an under-nourished Ministry of Environment to intervene, secure the
reviews, speak out, and ªnally act on behalf of environmental protec-
tion.417
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At the same time, these cases revealed dysfunctions in the Cana-
dian review system that became so obvious that Parliament could not
ignore them. In 1992, it responded with a new Canadian Environ-
mental Assessment Act418 which, with amendments in 2003,419 became
a stronger vehicle for environmentalists dwarfed by economic inter-
ests in a country still so rich in natural resources and undeveloped
space that it remains very much in conquest mode. The Canadian en-
vironmental impact assessment system, on paper, trumps that of the
United States in several ways, most importantly the independent re-
view panels; U.S. environmentalists would kill for them.420 As impor-
tant as their mechanisms, however, is the reliance of both systems,
U.S. and Canadian, on citizen enforcement, and it is here where the
U.S. civil society and its tradition of highly-organized and well-funded
groups able to challenge government decisions comes center stage.
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(2) In both systems, but more markedly in the United States, the
enforcement of environmental assessment requirements against un-
willing and non-disclosing agencies depends on judicial review.421 This
is most obvious at the state or provincial level, where development
pressures are highly localized and environmental critics speak out at
least at their social peril and at times more. It has become obvious to-
day at the national level as well, as seen in the United States with an
administration openly hostile to environmental policy and actively
seeking to limit environmental impact review.422 In such a climate, it
comes down to the courts or nobody.
Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman, and the Great Whale cases reveal the
great reluctance of Canadian courts to wade into this swamp. U.S. envi-
ronmental litigation is not a pretty sight, and more than one reviewing
court has ended up with years of supervision over national grazing
policies, surface mining, and the preservation of the Paciªc Salmon.
And so when the court in Canadian Wildlife Federation I stated, somewhat
wistfully, that laws like environmental assessment presume a measure of
governmental good faith, it was clearly not seeking to intervene. But
when the Canadian Supreme Court ªnally said, in Canadian Wildlife
Federation II, that it had to apply environmental law to, above all per-
sons, Ministers of the Crown, one sensed that they were crossing a Ru-
bicon. The crossing is not complete and will in all likelihood remain as
contested in Canada as it is here in the States, but most of the army
went across and, for the same reasons found in the United States, that
is where the Canadian judiciary will likely remain. To do less simply
nulliªes the will of the people expressed through law.
(3) What the many cases that surround Rafferty-Alameda, Old-
man, and the Great Whale also show is the terrible tension of federal-
ism in today’s world. The globe is smaller. Environmental problems
are larger, and they are growing. Chemicals from U.S. industries show
up in the Arctic, shared species like the caribou and salmon are tak-
ing a terrible beating, and no one is immune from deforestation, cli-
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mate change, or acid rain. The notion that the sources of these prob-
lems are best controlled by individual states and provinces, or even by
individual nations, is increasingly quaint and untenable.423 Yet these
are the premises under which Canada and the United States have or-
ganized themselves, and all nations have organized the world.
To expect a state or province, on the eternal hunt to win the
prize of economic development over its competitors, to give full shrift
to national and international interests, or even to long term
sustainability, in projects like Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman, and the
Great Whale is to expect the impossible. Political futures are local and
produced by short term gains. As for the long term, nobody gets their
name put on something that didn’t get built.
The United States, circa 2005, is on a rampage to unload federal
environmental responsibility, indeed all of the federal social responsi-
bility it can, onto states, half of whom are in deªcit and few of whom
have the appetite to impose environmental requirements on their
own. Canada, never having gone very far at the federal level in the
ªrst place, continues to place primary responsibility even for endan-
gered species protection—a matter many would consider of national
importance—at the provincial level.424 Call it “federalism” if one
wishes, or call it simply the bushhogging of environmental obstacles,
it ends up at the same place.
The Canadian Supreme Court was forced to deal with these is-
sues in all three stories related in this article. One must conclude that
its rulings reveal the serious ambiguity of Canadian governance with
regards to federalism. One feels the tension in an opinion declaring
that “environmental protection has become one of the major chal-
lenges of our time,” while at the same time straining not to overstep
constitutional limits for the federal government to do something
about it.425 The U.S. Supreme Court, for its part as well, has begun to
question the interstate commerce rationale underlying federal envi-
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ronmental law.426 The fact remains, however, that neither Louisiana
nor Alaska is going to place a priority on protecting its wetlands when
it comes to oil and gas production. Nor will Quebec see the Canadian
Shield as much more than a cash cow. How Canadian and the U.S.
commitments to federalism meet the challenge of national environ-
mental policy remains an open question.
(4) One last observation from Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman, and
the Great Whale is the most simple. Environmental review, safeguards,
and licenses are largely procedural. They lead to negotiated results.
With a demanding environmental agency and public support, these
efforts will lead to (in addition to a good deal of corporate image ad-
vertising) reduced pollution, mitigation measures, and a genuinely-
softened footprint. In most cases, however, these measures will be in-
adequate to offset the impacts. Not even close. The Piikan people may
get money to improve their way of life, and the Cree certainly will,
and that is a major plus. But their rivers are doomed.
In the cases at hand, the Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman, and La Grande
projects were built, the Rupert-Nottoway-Broadback grinds forward and
the Great Whale is on hold. Proposals like these never die. Were these
same projects proposed today, the provinces would be back in the lists
behind them and the federal environmental agencies, be they in Ottawa
or Washington, cowering in their tents. It would be up, once again, to
the people. Environmental review gives them a shot. Judicial review rein-
forces the shot. And on the success of that shot, so much depends.
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